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Henry Leland
Rad. Sec.

SUBSCRIPTION NO BONDAGE,

OR THE

PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES

AFFORDED BY

THE THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES

AS

GUIDES

IN

ALL THE BRANCHES

OF

ACADEMICAL EDUCATION.

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WITH AN

INTRODUCTORY LETTER

ON

THE DECLARATION

WHICH IT IS PROPOSED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR SUBSCRIPTION TO THE ARTICLES AT MATRICULATION.

By RUSTICUS.

Another error is, that, after the distribution of particular arts and sciences, men have abandoned Universality or *Philosophia prima*, which cannot but cease and stop all progression. For no perfect discovery can be made on a flat or a level. Neither is it possible to discover the more remote or deeper parts of any science, if you stand upon the level of the same science, and ascend not to a higher science. *Bacon.—Advancement of Learning.*

OXFORD,
J. H. PARKER:
RIVINGTON, LONDON: AND DEIGHTON, CAMBRIDGE.
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INTRODUCTORY LETTER.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

THIS Pamphlet was drawn up at your request, and it is now submitted to your approbation.

The notion that Subscription to Articles is imposed on students entering the University of Oxford as *a help to education* and not as *a test of faith*, has, I doubt not, occurred to many besides myself. It has been my endeavour,

First, to prove that this opinion is rational in itself, consistent with the views of those who drew up the Articles and introduced them into our Universities, and is justified by the analogy of the other cases in which assent to them is demanded.

Secondly, to shew, what precise purpose they are intended to effect in education—that in all Schools and Universities there is a contract expressed or implied between the teacher and learner, as to the principles on which the one agrees to teach and the other to learn—and that to state the terms of this contract is at once the most honest method, and the most serviceable to education.

Thirdly, to shew, that, if the terms or rules of study which a University imposes on its pupils are to be of any practical value in explaining to them the

course of general education upon which they are entering—in connecting the different branches of it with each other—or in removing perplexities which naturally arise in each—they must be drawn from the Science of Theology.

Fourthly, to shew, that by means of this principle we are enabled to answer several popular objections to our system, and even to convert them into arguments in its favour.

The whole Pamphlet was written before I had heard of the Declaration, which it is proposed to substitute for Subscription. I have nothing to say respecting the *purpose* of that Declaration, which I have not said already in the following pages; nothing respecting its particular *form*, which has not been urged much better than I could urge it by other objectors. If the principle, which I have asserted, be a true one, the new form of admission must be far more gratuitously offensive to the Dissenters than that which it supersedes. They cannot understand why a body constituted for purposes of general education should impose a confession of faith on its members. *My* answer is, our Articles are not enforced as a confession of faith, they are imposed for the sake of our general studies; and were they removed, our education would lose its meaning, its manliness, its coherency. The supporters of the *Declaration* can offer no answer to the complaint, they are imposing a direct test which means exclusion, and can mean nothing else.

But the advocates of the Declaration, I perceive,

rest their hopes far less on its intrinsic merit, than upon the alleged confusions and contradictions among the advocates of Subscription. Each one of you, they say, has a different notion of its meaning; how is it possible, then, that we can explain it to the world? I should be loth to add any force to this objection by offering an opinion on Subscription different from that of many who contend for it, if I did not feel sure, that what has ingeniously been converted into an argument for instant change, will strike sober persons as the strongest reason for remaining quiet. If there is so much confusion on this subject even in the minds of considerate persons, why call upon them to legislate? Any measure, which is the fruit of such a state of mind, is likely to be a subject of speedy but too late repentance. This point is most candidly and strongly put by Mr. Sewell. "We seem to be placed," he says, "in a new position, and to require for our guidance many peculiar views, which have for some time been partially lost sight of, because they did not bear directly on our practice. Perhaps nothing but much discussion, with all its accompaniments of tedious enquiry and varieties of opinion, will enable us just at present to see our way fairly before us." Surely this statement is most sound and reasonable. The supporters of the Declaration do not deny that Subscription means something. The character of those who introduced it, the time which it has lasted, even the multitude of plausible notions respecting its purpose, are presumptions to this extent, which they cannot

rebut. As happens commonly in the like cases, custom has made us thoughtless about the purpose of the act, till at last it has nearly escaped us. If this is a reason for abolishing the practice, any practice which is so good as to become habitual through a long course of years must suffer the same fate.

With respect to the assertion, that it is impossible to make the meaning of Subscription intelligible to persons without the University, it is the same which is every day urged as a reason for casting away portions of our Liturgy; "They may, perhaps, have a very good sense to you or me, but they must mislead the people." The experience of many who are living among humble and ignorant persons is the best answer to it. They can testify, that while they suffered loose and vague notions respecting these passages to remain in their own minds, they were indeed utterly incapable of interpreting them to others; but, after diligent and humble meditation, what had been perplexed became so simple to their own minds, that they could expound it to the poorest rustic, and seemed to them so much an organic part of the service of form, to which it belonged, that the whole would lose its meaning and life, if it were taken away.

I cannot doubt that the true idea of Subscription, whatever it be, would commend itself just as readily to the least gifted student or the dullest English parent. If, for instance, I should have succeeded in developing that true idea, would any

plain citizen or country gentleman be greatly perplexed by being told, that these Articles contain the terms, according to which the teacher agrees to teach and the learner to learn, just as the memorandum previous to a deed of conveyance contains the terms upon which a seller agrees to sell, and a purchaser to purchase.

You will, I fear, observe proofs of hasty writing in these sheets; for the thoughts I have no such apology to offer. The subject was forced upon my attention more than ten years before it became one of popular discussion, and owing to various circumstances it has been impossible for me to dismiss it from my mind since. I do not mention this in order to get credit for my statements, which must stand or fall by their own merits, but merely as an excuse for entering on a controversy, in which much abler persons are already engaged.

I ought, however, to add, that these sheets have not been written with any hope of influencing Members of Parliament or the ruling persons in the University, but with the far humbler object of leading some of the younger students into a more correct appreciation of their advantages, and a more quiet and thankful use of them. This is a pleasure to which a very insignificant person may aspire. If it is granted to me, I trust I shall feel humble gratitude for it, and it will be much enhanced by knowing, that you and other kind friends heartily sympathize in it.

I am, very faithfully, yours,

THE AUTHOR.

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SUBSCRIPTION NO BONDAGE,

&c.

THE University of Oxford requires, that every student at Matriculation shall subscribe to Thirty-nine Articles. According to the common notion, this Subscription is demanded as a test of the student's conformity to the Church of England. Lord Brougham, in one of the speeches which he delivered during the last Session, took this notion for granted, and contended, that Oxford had compassed that object by a circuitous and oppressive process, which Cambridge had attained by a simple declaration. If his Lordship's premises were correct, I do not see how it would be possible to evade his conclusions.

But there are two objections to that premiss. The first is, that Oxford has a security for her Students' allegiance to the Church of England, which is at least equivalent to any verbal declaration. She requires them all to participate in the acts and ordinances of the Church. The imposition of Articles, therefore, for this object would be superfluous. The second is, that Subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles is *not* a proof of conformity to the Church of England. To be a member of the Church of England, is to be in com-

munion with the Church of England; the phrases are convertible. But the Church of England has not imposed these Articles upon her communicants. She does not require that her communicants should even have read them. She has one formulary, the Apostles' Creed, which she expects every baptized child to learn, and every attendant upon her services to utter[a]. This Creed is generically different from the Thirty-nine Articles, as different as the Oath of Allegiance is from the Act of Settlement. I could easily shew, and I purpose hereafter to shew at some length, that it is directly contrary to the principle of the Church of England, as much contrary to her principle as it is in accordance with the principles of most who dissent from her, to impose any terms whatever upon her communicants, except that acknowledgment of their union to a common head, which is implied in the very fact of their meeting together, and expressed in the Apostles' Creed. It is enough at present to insist upon this point, that the Church of England does not recognize the Thirty-nine Articles as terms of admission into her fellowship. And, since the terms of admission to a society or corporation must, of course, be the same for all its members; since the opposite notion is not merely an unjust illiberal notion, (like a law for the rich and a law for the poor,) but an impossible notion, a self-contradiction; these Articles, not being terms for the whole body of communicants, cannot be terms for that portion of them which dwell in the University of Oxford.

[a] "....Therefore I shall rehearse to you the Articles of our Faith, that you may know whether you believe as a Christian man should or no." *Order for the Visitation of the Sick.*

But if these Articles are not imposed for this purpose, why are they imposed? One would suppose, from some notion, right or wrong, that they will be helps in education. If we had never heard any other reason, this would have seemed the most natural. The other is clearly an after-thought. It *might* have been a more correct explanation, though more far fetched. But, if it be proved not correct, we may surely recur to the more obvious one, and enquire what advantage our ancestors expected from these Articles in University education, and whether the expectation was a reasonable or a foolish one.

I may, however, be encountered by some opposition before I can enter upon these questions. I may be told, that these Articles bear upon their front the character of a Confession of Faith; that they are not as like any other compositions as they are like those which men allow to deserve this name; that, whatever other uses I imagine for them, those, who compiled them, obviously intended them as a Confession of Faith; that they would not be imposed upon the Ministers of the English Church at Ordination, if they were any thing else. I will take these points in their order.

Does not the internal evidence of the Articles favour the notion of their being a Confession of Faith, and exclude the notion of their being any thing else?

No one will deny that the Articles are a set of precisely worded, authoritative propositions; nor that they take cognizance of various philosophical and theological notions; nor that they are, to a very great extent, occupied in denouncing certain notions as *not* true. In some of these particulars they may resemble the Confessions of Faith in use among

foreign Churches; in all they are different from that Confession of Faith, the use of which in our own Church was approved and ratified by the compilers of these Articles. That Confession is entirely positive, and entirely personal. Its formula is "I believe," and not "A is B," "C is not D." It refers wholly to persons, and their acts. It takes no notice of by-gone or current opinions. It objects to nothing. Place these two documents before an unprejudiced sensible man, and I apprehend he will say without hesitation, "The subject matter of these two compositions is evidently the same; in form and kind, and, therefore, in their objects, they are altogether different."

But is there any other work extant of which he could say, This more nearly resembles the Thirty-nine Articles than they resemble the Apostles' Creed? I believe there is. I believe that, if Bacon's Novum Organum were put before such a person as I have imagined, he would say decisively, "In the subject matter these two compositions are evidently different; in form and kind, and therefore, I should suppose, in the objects for which they were framed, they are alike. In each I find a set of dictatorial propositions intended to warn students against certain alleged superstitions, which, as the authors believed or feigned to believe, had a tendency to frustrate the pursuit of knowledge and the attainment of truth in the departments of human thought, in which they respectively interested themselves." This would be his verdict. It is perfectly compatible with such an opinion that he should think the Novum Organum the wisest, and the Thirty-nine Articles the most foolish set of propositions ever drawn up. But I have supposed the arbitrator to possess such a share of logic and common sense, that

his judgment upon the *genus* of a composition would not be in the least affected by his estimate of its merits.

But, secondly, have we not reason to suppose that those who drew up the Articles meant them to be a Confession of Faith, and nothing else? A few plain considerations will answer the question. These Articles, as every one knows, were framed at the Reformation. They at least were no part of those old forms which, we are told, the Reformers wanted courage or power to sweep away. They are the inventions, the innovations of that intellectual age. Wherever Protestantism prevailed, logical propositions prevailed likewise. In those countries which vaunted a pure exclusive Protestantism they soon prevailed to the banishment of all ancient forms and symbols. As far as the early continental reformers are concerned, this result was owing to necessity rather than taste. Calvin did not despise the Confessions of the early Church: Knox, his pupil, spake the Apostles' Creed aloud on his death-bed. Luther, the *man* of the Reformation, the brave, hearty, home-bred Luther clave to these ancient forms with no half affection. He declared that they contained the pith and marrow of Divinity; other men might be more profound, but, for his part, he averred that he never got beyond this child's learning. It was, therefore, not the fault of the German Reformers, nor wholly of the Helvetians, that the intellectual confessions, to which the intellectual war of the Reformation gave birth, ultimately superseded the spiritual formularies, which bind the members of the Church, to day, in holy fellowship with Augustine, Hilary, Athanasius, nay, with Polycarp and Ignatius. But the position of the Continental

Reformers was militant. Every week, almost, they were obliged to answer some papal manifesto, disclaim some ignorant defender, rescue themselves from Anabaptist cooperation, or bring out the deepening shades of doctrine which distinguished them from each other. Their peculiar gift was intellectual vigour and subtlety; their circumstances almost compelled them to exalt that gift above those other still more precious gifts, which they shared in common with humbler Christians. The predominance which they gave to the intellect over the heart may easily be explained and pardoned; but many a Swiss and German patriot may wish that his forgiveness could blot out the effects which it has produced upon the moral and political condition of his countrymen! *Our* Reformers did *not* aim at establishing a pure and exclusive Protestantism. They believed with Martin Luther, who had fought the beast in the closest arena, who had felt every one of its claws at his heart, and who hated it with the most perfect hatred, that the old Prayers are not Popish, but are the most powerful antidotes against Popery. They believed that the deadly sin of Popery had been, that it corrupted these prayers, and hid them from the understanding of the people. They believed, that to restore them to their primitive form, and give them to the people for their daily bread, was the noblest work of Reformation which they could achieve. For they thought, that, in order to educate a people, in order to lead them on from that implicit faith, in which all knowledge begins, to that actual faith, which alone is knowledge, you must not address yourself to that judging faculty, which is granted in various measures, and to some scarcely at all, but to that heart and conscience, which are the common

inheritance of all: and this, even for the sake of that faculty, and that it may receive the highest cultivation of which it is capable. Here then was another point in which they differed from the continental Reformers. To confute adversaries, was the great vocation of the one; to educate the people, of the other. Here too was a point, in which they differed from their successors, who *perfected* the English Reformation in the next age. The Westminster Assembly prosecuted the objects of Cranmer and Latimer by the methods of Calvin and Zwingle. They endeavoured to instruct the people, the poor, the halt, the maimed, women, and children, by logical definitions. Our Reformers did not attempt this: but was their logic and subtlety therefore wasted? Because they loved and honoured old Latimer as a very prince among them, did they count all wit, which was less homely and popular than his, as useless? By no means. They did not swerve from their great object; but in order to accomplish that object, various expedients were necessary. The people were to be educated; but who should educate them? The people were to be delivered from superstitions; who were to deliver them? First, the Ministers of the people; these they believed were the commissioned educators, liberators of mankind. Secondly, in cooperation with these, professional men and the higher class, generally. But how are they to be fitted for their task? What certainty have we that they will escape the infection of the disease which they are to cure? *Quis custodiet ipsos Custodes?* Popery appealed to the heart and the senses, but it appealed also to the understanding. It could converse as easily, as familiarly, as plausibly with doctors as with ploughmen. How likely is it that they who are to set

men free from the iron chains of the world, will come forth themselves bound hand and foot with the cobweb fetters of the schools! This danger must be provided against, and the Reformers drew up these Articles as a provision against it. The remedy may have been clumsy, ineffectual, worse than the disease; that is not the point about which I am now contending. I am merely concerned to maintain that this was their object. My readers will judge whether the facts of the case, thus briefly collected, do make it probable that I am right; and the more these facts are meditated upon and the more fresh facts are sought for, the more confident shall I be of their verdict. But if this were the intention of the Reformers, then it will follow, that these Articles were not first devised for some ecclesiastical purpose, and afterwards introduced into the Universities in order to further that purpose; but that they were primarily intended for instruments of education, and were adopted by the University, because it was a body instituted to educate young men, and for no other reason whatever[n].

But, thirdly, Why then are these Articles subscribed by Ministers of the Church of England at ordination? My answer to this question may be, in part, guessed from the remarks under the last head. One thing I will assert boldly. They who hold Articles to be terms of communion, have never been able to shew any cause why either the Church or the State should have chosen to impose a different Confession upon

[n] That the Articles were in the first instance introduced into the University with a view to promote sound education, and not as a test of Churchmembership, appears from the facts recorded by Antony à Wood. See Note at the end.

the ministers of the Church from that which is required of the people. Archdeacon Blackburne and the writers of the Confessional, in all their arguments and their declamation against the impolicy and injustice of the imposition, have never grappled with this point. They never appear once to have asked themselves, If these Articles be intended as a Confession of Faith, how comes it to pass that the lay members of our congregation are not as much taxed with them as we are? It is in vain to take refuge in the plea, that the State has a hold upon the Clergy, its workmen, which it has not upon the ordinary communicant. We admit that the State has a hold upon them. We admit that our subscribing the Articles at ordination is an incident of the alliance between Church and State. But when you have got that concession, you are not a whit the better for it. You cannot shew why upon your supposition the State has any interest in enforcing Subscription to these particular Articles more than to any other imaginable document. Whereas, upon my view of the case, the explanation is easy, and in accordance, I think, with all the circumstances of the time in which these propositions were composed, and began to be used amongst us.

The period of the Reformation is spoken of as the period of the Church's resurrection to its true and proper life. But it was surely quite as much a period of *national* resurrection. Each nation which felt the shock first communicated to Luther, awoke to a consciousness of its being a nation. Englishmen felt that they were Englishmen, Germans that they were Germans, no longer mere portions of the Popedom, but endued with a distinct life, a precious gift of God, which for his honour they were bound to defend

against all who aimed at universal sovereignty, whether they were Bishops of Rome, or Emperors of Germany. All the writings of this period shew us how that sense of personal distinctness, which was in fact the grand practical feeling developed by the Reformation, was connected with the sense of national distinctness. Then first did kings, set free from subjection to a visible ruler, become conscious that they were not merely the first chieftains of the aristocracy, but that they had a distinct power committed to them by God himself, upon the preservation of which, the coherency of all the national relations depends. Such a consciousness was nearly sure at first to produce tyrannical claims. It was not wonderful that there should be a Henry to assert a divine *right*, before there was an Edward and an Elizabeth to acknowledge a divine *trust*. When that was once acknowledged by the head of the system, a sense of responsibility was communicated to the members of it. The *State* began to understand itself, and to feel that it had vast duties to discharge, the neglect of which would leave it rebellious, cowardly, impracticable subjects.

The people must be educated, and the government must provide for their education. Now, if there were in the country at that time a body recently liberated, like the State, from a visible tyranny, and asserting that it had received power and commission from an invisible head, to perform that task, which the State felt it needful to undertake, but to which it felt that no strength belonging to it was adequate; if that body was found to be making good its claims by putting forth a mighty influence over the minds and spirits of men; if each believed the other to be appointed ministers of God, for different though concurrent tasks; if

the representatives of the State believed that its existence was not really upheld by fleets and armies, but by the recognition of a Spiritual Authority superior to itself; if the representatives of the Church believed that it was no contradiction for those who held the higher dignity to be the servants of those who held the lower; (for that this contradiction of a lord becoming a servant, was the very means of asserting his lordship, and the key to all the harmonies of Christianity; and for that they could not so mightily assert the grandeur of a spiritual agency, as by shewing that all civil powers were necessarily helpless without it;) if the representatives of the Church believed further, that they could not refuse their cooperation to the State, without denying that the State was bound to the performance of that duty, to which it believed itself bound, or else denying that the Ministers of the Gospel were the most efficient agents for performing that duty; if, in consequence of these observations, that union, which had always existed between these two bodies, (though during the Papal period under confused and often changing conditions; and with a perpetual alternation of civil and ecclesiastical subserviency, an accident which they observed also in the States which had adopted the Presbyterian discipline,) now took a definite intelligible form; it followed of course, that on each side there would be certain understood demands and stipulations.

Some of these would of course refer to property. On the one hand, the representatives of the Church would be bound to reject all propositions of a salary; for, since the office of reproving the actions of Governors and Magistrates is one, with which they have been intrusted, and which the same principle, that forbids

them to use it factiously, will not permit them to forego, they must refuse to do any act which could by possibility change the service of the State into the service of its Ministers for the time being. On the other hand, if the churchmen had said, 'We will throw ourselves upon the liberality of our flocks;' the statesmen, I conceive, were justified in answering, 'We cannot trust you to perform a task, the right discharge of which must often offend those who are to be served by it, while you are their pensioners and dependents.' These or some such feelings on each side may, we presume, have determined the State, as a matter of policy, (apart from all other considerations,) to found, or, if Providence had already bestowed it, to uphold some permanent provision for the clergy, which would make them the hirelings neither of the government nor of the people. But there would be also stipulations of another kind, suggested, not by reason only, but by experience. The statesmen, I apprehend, were bound to demand some security from the churchmen that they were what they professed to be. 'We have found,' they may have said, 'persons wearing your gowns, bearing your episcopal seal, no co-operators with the State, but its deadly enemies; no teachers of the people, but their enslavers. We want some security on both these points, what will you give us?' Now I find, that oaths of allegiance and supremacy, or some equivalent for them, are taken, and have always been taken, by English Protestant clergymen at ordination. I find that the Thirty-nine Articles are subscribed by them at the same time. The first, I contend, is the pledge offered by the ministers of Christ that they will not be disloyal teachers; the second, that they will not be superstitious teachers.

In the first case they submit to the form imposed by the State upon all its officers; in the second, they volunteer, as a security, that form of words, which was expressly drawn up as a warning against the superstitions which the State dreads, and according to which they have been instructed in the University. I submit, that this explanation is more consistent with the facts of the case, and with reason, than any which can be produced on the other side. But this explanation is grounded upon the assertion, that the Thirty-nine Articles are not terms of communion, but are conditions of thought, primarily designed to assist education by warning students against superstitions, which have hindered, and are likely to hinder, the pursuit of knowledge, and the attainment of truth.

In answering these preliminary objections, we have discovered that object which the University proposes to itself in imposing Articles. These are our *conditions of thought;* by these the teachers engage to teach; by these the learners engage to learn. But I do not imagine that, by establishing this point, I shall have brought over any considerable number of adversaries to believe that this imposition is reasonable. They may perceive that the grounds, on which they have attacked the existing system, are unsound; but the attack itself they will not abandon. On the contrary, I can easily imagine a person speaking thus: "The Articles are less objectionable to me, in the character of a Religious Test, than in this new character of intellectual conditions. To force a particular Creed upon the conscience is a device of ordinary priestcraft, we know what it means. There is no

trickery or underhandedness in it. The desire of saddling the mind with theological rules of thought, under pretence of emancipating it, is more cunning and more odious. It is not, however, new. When have not kings and priests pretended that their schemes of bondage, or blood, were contrived for the special good of those who were the objects of them?" Now separating the argument in this passage from the vituperation; there are two distinct grounds of complaint against us. The objector may mean that the University is unjust because it imposes conditions of thought upon its students at all—or that it is unjust and illiberal because these conditions are theological. And we shall find, I believe, that most of our opponents do actually fall into one of these two classes. Some talk of the great tyranny which is practised where that is taken for granted, to which many object, and which therefore ought to be proved, when prejudice is substituted for evidence. This is an objection to conditions of thought *as such*. It does not apply at all more to theological conditions of thought than to physical. For every one knows that there are differences of opinion, and most wide differences of opinion, upon those questions, differences affecting not particular parts only, but the very law and method of the whole study. The other class, of which Lord Fitzwilliam is a specimen, maintain, that it is a great hardship to impose "on boys fresh from Eton, Articles treating of such subjects as free-will, predestination, &c." This is an objection to the *subject matter* of our Articles.

Are conditions of thought justifiable in education? This is our first question, in the discussion of which we must not be interrupted with the exclamation,

"Oh! but you impose *such* conditions upon us!" for that point will be considered afterwards.

If conditions of thought are justifiable, of what kind should they be? This is our second question, in discussing which we must not be interrupted with exclamations, "Yes, but why *force* these upon us?" for that point we shall have settled already.

With respect to those who object to conditions of thought altogether, I fear that they are labouring under a great misapprehension.

They fancy that there are conditions of thought imposed at Oxford, and that none are imposed at Edinburgh, London, Göttingen, Berlin. I deny the position altogether. I say conditions of thought are imposed upon every student at every one of these Universities. Every one of the lecturers or teachers at each of them imposes his own conditions of thought upon the mind of his pupil. In so far forth as he teaches his pupil at all, he teaches him by imposing upon him his own conditions of thought, and in so far forth as that pupil learns of that teacher, he learns by assenting and consenting to his conditions of thought. Granted that he now and then kicks vehemently against the dicta of his teacher, granted that he discovers some suppressed premiss in the argument or mind of his teacher, from which he dissents; just so far as he does so, he does not learn of that teacher. Twist the question as you will, it is imposible it should be otherwise. If the parent who sends his son to an University, does not understand that he is sending his son to learn something, and that the terms upon which he learns any thing are that certain conditions of thought will be imposed upon him, and that his son

will assent and consent to those conditions of thought; if he does not know this, or if he fancies that his particular son will be exempt from this universal law, and will get his information in some other method, he is practising a very gross imposition upon himself. But no parent does really act upon such a ridiculous supposition. He speaks prose, though he does not know it. He considers with himself whether the teachers in this or that University are most likely to teach his son rightly, whether he can most safely trust him to this set of persons, or to that. And this is all one as if he said to himself, Are the conditions of thought which this or that set of persons will impose on my son the most just, the most reasonable, the most likely to preserve him from falling into error, and assist him in finding truth?

In Professor Turton's interesting pamphlet upon this question, we are told, that two signal attempts have been made to conduct academies without any impositions of Articles. One of these experiments was made by Dr. Doddridge at Northampton, the other by Mr. Belsham. The learned Professor discusses the *success* of these experiments. I deny their *reality*. I deny that either Dr. Doddridge or Mr. Belsham did teach without imposing conditions of thought on their pupils.

With respect to the former, the proof is easy. I have before me a posthumous work of Dr. Doddridge, entitled, "A Course of Lectures on the principal subjects in Pneumatology, Ethics, and Divinity." London, 1763. These were his Lectures, delivered to his pupils in the Academy at Northampton. The book opens thus:

PART I.

" Of the powers and faculties of the human mind.

AXIOM 1.

" Existence is a simple idea, which we get both by consci-
" ousness and observation.

DEFINITION 1.

" Whatever our thoughts are immediately employed about,
" whether as simply perceiving it, or as asserting or denying
" any thing concerning it, is called an idea.

SCHOLIUM.

" We do not here enter largely into the distinction which
" the metaphysicians make, between *Ens reale*, which exists
" without any dependence upon our thoughts, and *Ens ratio-*
" *nis*, which owes its existence to its being the object of them;
" nor into the question between the Realists and Nominalists;
" but by Being in the process of this discourse we mean *Ens*
" *reale*.

DEFINITION 3.

" Whatever is contained in the adequate idea of any being,
" is called its properties.

COROLLARY 1.

" A being is the same with all its properties taken together.
" And, therefore,

COROLLARY 2.

" We can have no conception of any substance distinct
" from all the properties of the being in which they inhere;
" for this would imply that the being itself inheres, and so
" on to infinity.

DEFINITION 4.

" Body is an extended solid being.

AXIOM 2.

"Thought is a simple idea which we get by reflecting on "what passes in our own minds.

DEFINITION 5.

"Spirit is a thinking being, or a being which has the power "of thought."

There are four quarto pages more of Axioms and Definitions, in this strain, before the Author proceeds to a single Proposition or Demonstration.

Are not these conditions of thought? Are not they disputable conditions of thought? Are not they conditions of thought, against which not a few priest-ridden Englishmen, but five sixths of the schools in enlightened Germany, one half of the schools in liberal France, would solemnly and indignantly protest?

It is equally false that Mr. Belsham imposed no conditions of thought upon his pupils. What was the scheme of which he boasted so much as the proof and token of his liberality? He set his pupils to discover all the texts in Scripture which favoured the assertion of our Lord's Divinity, and all which impugned it. They were to count the forces on each side, strike the balance, and make up their minds. Now in this act all these conditions of thought were assumed. It was assumed, that one class of those assertions do not, as we believe, sustain and uphold the other, so that either one would be false, if the other were taken away, but that they are in fact contradictions, of which the first or the last must be squared, to coincide with the other. It was assumed, that the Bible is not, as it appears to be upon the face of it, the record of a series of facts, through which the nature of God is gradually evolved

and exhibited to the view of man, but that it is a set of definitions. Lastly, it was assumed that these young men could arrive at truth on a moral question, by the exercise of a single one of their faculties, namely, that faculty or that branch of the discursive faculty, which is conversant with the definition of names. All these three assumptions must have been made and imposed upon his pupils, for these only will make reasonable the task upon which he set them*.

The pupils may or may not have been conscious that they were assenting to these conditions of thought, and were acting upon them. The teacher may or may not have been conscious of them himself. It would be a poor compliment to his logical powers to suppose he was not, but neither their ignorance nor his makes the least difference to the question. The conditions were, to all intents and purposes, imposed by the teacher, and assented to by the pupils.

Is there then no difference in the course pursued by the University of Oxford, in its imposition of the Articles and that pursued by Dr. Doddridge, Mr. Belsham, and the Universities of Germany or of Scotland? There is, and a very important difference; a difference, which respects both the parents and guardians of the students, and the students themselves. In Oxford, the conditions of thought upon which the teachers teach, and the learners consent to learn, are *stated*. She holds forth the Thirty-nine Articles, and says to the parents of every youth who

* Whether there be not a fourth assumption implied in these, and especially in the last, that truths respecting the nature of God can be arrived at without any prayer to God or communion with Him, is a deeply interesting point, which I leave to the reader's consideration.

is sent to her, 'See, these are our conditions of thought; upon these we propose to teach your child. If you like them, well; if not, send him somewhere else.' In the other institutions which I have mentioned, the parent must get at the conditions of thought, according to which his son will be trained, as he can. He may make fair and reasonable enough guesses on the subject, guesses upon which, without the least unwarrantable presumption, he may act, but they must be guesses: the teachers bind themselves to nothing; there is no direct positive contract on their part as to the terms which they mean to impose, in a case in which he knows some terms must be imposed. This is the difference as to the parents or guardians of the pupils; next, as to the pupil himself. This difference will be more readily apprehended, if we consider what are the objects of University education, as distinguished from other education.

Facts are communicated to the *child*. He is told, for instance, that the Earth goes round the Sun; and, after having received this information upon the authority of his parent, he is led by various gradual processes into the apprehension of what it means. *Laws* are communicated to the *boy;* he is apprized, for instance, of the law of gravitation, and to this he is taught to refer the fact so contrary to sense and experience, which has been announced to him in his childhood and had by degrees become part of his actual faith. Here the education of most men closes. Happy, if they have been under the guidance of those, whom they could, in the first instance, trust implicitly, and who, secondly, were anxious for nothing so much as to convert their implicit faith into an explicit rational faith. But for some is reserved a third stage of edu-

cation. They are to be professional students. They are to know not only facts and laws, but to understand the processes of mind through which various facts and laws have been evolved; they are to pass, as it were, into the position of the first discoverers of these facts or laws, and to go with them into the cells and avenues of thought, out of which, and through which, they have worked their way into light and clearness. The professional student is not only to know that the earth goes round the sun, and to refer this, and all similar and subordinate facts, to the law of gravitation, but he is to read the Principia. These men in truth know no more than their brethren, but they are the stewards and watchers of all that is known, and the guides to what is yet unknown; and they are fit to be so, because they make themselves acquainted with the different obstructions arising from the darkness of the human mind, to the discovery of truth, or to the retention of it. Now if these remarks have at all unfolded the idea of University education, they will also have unfolded the difference between Oxford, and the other institutions of which I was speaking.

The child and the boy have facts and laws communicated to them, but the conditions of the understanding itself, the laws under which it must act, in order that it may act freely, these are not communicated to either of them, for they do not belong to their stage of growth. But when the young man is entering upon a course of professional study; when he is becoming, for the first time, strictly speaking, a student, seeking truth for himself, though not alone or without guides; is it fair, is it just, to keep from him the knowledge of these conditions? Is it not

right, is it not honouring his advancing manhood, to take it for granted, that he now understands whereabouts he is, that he appreciates and yet contemplates with becoming awe the noble position of being himself now admitted to the privilege of a thinking rational creature, and that he has learned by experience of the strifes and waywardness of boyhood, how inevitably he must forego all these privileges, and sink back into the condition of a beast and a slave, unless he will submit every portion of his mind as well as of his character to the guidance of reasonable laws? It may be very ridiculous to assume the existence of such a temper of mind; but is it not more ridiculous to frame institutions for learning on the assumption of the absence of that, without which learning is impossible? If there be no desire of knowledge, no feeling of being a student, none of the dispositions which may be wrought up gradually into this feeling, I know not how instruction is possible; but if there be these feelings, then I contend, that the student has a right to require from his teachers that he shall not be left in the dark respecting the laws and conditions of study any more than about the mere facts of it. He has a right to require, that the conditions of thought in his teacher's mind should be set before him, and that he should not be left to get at them hereafter by laborious inference. The difference then between Oxford and other Universities is, not that she imposes conditions of thought upon her students, and that they assent and consent to them; for so far all institutions are alike; but that *she states* what are her conditions of thought. Which method has the advantage, which is the more honest, and more favourable to a student's

progress, I leave to the consideration of reasonable men.

'But why are your conditions of thought theological? theological and nothing else? Are your studies merely theological? If it be so, tell us plainly. We fancied that you professed to instruct our sons in several branches of human knowledge; or, perhaps, your conditions of thought need not bear any reference to those studies. They are to govern your whole system of education; and yet they teach only upon one branch of it. Very satisfactory conditions indeed: very like their pretended counterpart, Bacon's Novum Organon, which governs the whole class of subjects which are comprehended under the head of Natural Philosophy, whether Geology, Chemistry, Astronomy, or any other; prescribing a method which is as applicable to one as to another, warning against superstitions to which one as much as another is liable. And then it is odd that you should just have lighted upon this one particular subject—Theology! why not any other? why not conditions of thought for Poetry or History? why for just this, which we have fancied that priests were rather anxious to get the first and last word upon? Gentle Doctors, tell us why?' With these or some such phrases will Mr. Bulwer, or whoever is to be the new advocate of the Dissenters, entertain the House of Commons, if the position for which I am contending should chance to be maintained by any member on the other side. I purpose to answer the question. I purpose to shew why conditions of thought, which are intended to regulate the whole system of studies in a University, ought to be theological, and ought not to be any thing else. And that the grounds of my ar-

gument may be the better understood, I begin with this concession. I admit, that, if the conditions of thought imposed in a University do not deal with questions, which must naturally, and without laborious deductions, rise out of the subjects which are studied in that University, and these questions such as must be answered in order to make the subject intelligible; or, if there is any one subject studied at the University, to which they do not so refer, that this study could suffer from the want of them; or, if they do not take cognizance of such errors and superstitions, as can be shewn from experience to have interfered with the pursuit of all these studies, and as can be further shewn to endanger them now as much as in former times; they do not fulfil the purpose for which they have been devised and are imposed.

In discussing the question, I shall act as if Mr. Thirlwall had proved his proposition, that Theology is no *direct* or *primary* part of University instruction. I do not for a moment acknowledge that proposition to be proved. I believe that there are three objects of ordinary human interest, GOD, MAN, NATURE; and that our education is not universal, if there is not a distinct branch of study corresponding to each of these objects. But I waive this point. I shall suppose that we are only concerned with two of these subjects. And I shall discuss the question in this way; I shall enquire what are the questions, which most directly and inevitably arise out of those studies which relate to man, and most require conditions of thought to make them profitable, and to hinder them from turning into superstitions. I shall then endeavour to shew, that there exists between these studies and those which relate to *nature*, which have as I confess Ar-

ticles or an Organon of their own, such a connection, that the latter cannot be cultivated where the former are neglected, or are not conducted under right conditions.

The studies which are included in our Literæ Humaniores[c] at Oxford, are the same which I suppose pass under that name or some similar one in other Universities. They are these, Poetry, History, Ethics, which may roughly be said to correspond with what are called mixed Mathematics in the course of natural studies. The two remaining studies, Philology and Logic, answering to the pure Mathematics in the same course. I begin with Poetry.

I will not enter into any metaphysical discussions respecting the reasons which have induced the University to make Poetry a branch of its studies. A University professing to study Man, would certainly have laid itself open to most reasonable imputations, if such a subject had been omitted. If, indeed, with a learned Archbishop and distinguished member of the University of Oxford, we believed that Poetry means thoughts put into ornamented language, our attention to it is utterly unjustifiable. But only very illustrious personages are entitled to deal in such parodoxes as these. Common persons must maintain the com-

[c] It would be almost superfluous to mention, were there not numbers in our day who scorn philology, and never look into our older writers, that the word Humanity in its vulgar sense as equivalent with gentleness or kindness, especially towards the lower orders of creation, in its scholastic sense as equivalent with cultivation, refinement, φιλοκαλία, and in its philosophical sense as the cognate substantive to human (*Homo* sum *humani* nihil alienum a me puto) is the same word, the last meaning of which includes both the former, as the second properly understood includes the first.

mon faith, that poetry has made its way to the hearts of men in all ages, only because it is the expression of some of their deepest, most real, and most permanent feelings. On this ground, and on this ground only, has it a place in a course of Humanity. Whilst pursuing this study, I am encountered with some very deep and embarrassing questions. What, it will be said, does the University of Oxford then require its pupils to study that class of writers in the seventeenth century, whom Johnson has stigmatized as the metaphysical poets, or those more justly deserving the name, who have risen up in our own day, in England or in Germany? She requires no such thing. But she does not think it a hardship upon boys fresh from Eton to impose upon them the reading of Homer, or even of the Greek Tragedies. Now I imagine, that any one reading Homer in a plain and simple way, with his eyes open, is likely to make some such observations as these. Here is a most living exhibition of men like myself, feeling and acting, but all the actions and doings of these men, all their feelings, all their energies, are referred to the influence and operation of a race of superior invisible beings. I open the first book, and I find the ordinary fact of a pestilence raging through a camp, attributed to the agency of a superior power. I pass on a step further, and I find the heart of a chieftain influenced to the act of calling a council by another power. I read on a little further, and I find a description of a conflict passing in the mind of the same chieftain, of which an invisible protectress is conscious, and which she strives to calm. I proceed farther, and I am presented with one of these beings as an object of adoration and propitiation. I find another an object of filial entreaty and supplication.

I find the same power acting as a mediatrix between her human son, and one who is described as the common parent of all visible and invisible creatures; and before I close this first book, I am presented with a vision of these powers, no longer in their relation to man, but forming a society and fellowship among themselves. And this book is but a specimen of all that follows it. Have I a description, exquisitely and self-evidently true, of the conflict which passes in the mind of a frail beauty when summoned to the side of her unworthy lover; the resistance of feminine dignity, and the temptation of habitual vanity and self-indulgence? I am told that the nurse who summoned her is the goddess of Desire, taking for the time the form of a hag, speaking through her voice to an answering spirit in the heart of Helen. Do I hear of a chieftain displaying unwonted energy and prowess? it is a goddess who inspired him with all the energy and life that gave him a glory in the sight of men. Do I hear of a skilful archer tempted to break a solemn treaty sealed by the blood of sheep and the pledging of right hands? it is an invisible power, that very power to whom he owes the skill of which he is vain, who tempts him to the deed. And wherever I turn, I find myself saluted with descriptions of heroes, who have at once a divine and human parentage, these heroes being the deliverers of the earth from their oppressors, and the founders of national societies. And, lastly, I find every national society or fellowship subsisting only in the faith of some invisible protector, by whose favour it acquired its order, by whose favour it maintains its union, and whose desertion must cause its destruction. I say, it is impossible for any body, quietly and calmly reading Homer, and wishing to understand it, to avoid making

these observations. But, if the mind of a student were so obtuse through want of previous exercise, it is the very business of his teacher to awaken him to these observations, for unless he make them, Homer is to him a mere dead letter. He may be able to construe the Greek, but he will not consider the Poem as part of a course of Humanity; it will teach him nothing of his fellow creatures, nothing of himself. But, if he has not utterly passed over facts, lying upon the very surface of the book which he is reading, and requiring no cunning nor acuteness to bring them out, an enquiring mind will suggest to itself, or intelligent teachers will suggest to it, such reflections as these. Here is a man who describes all that I see with the greatest clearness, and brings it before me with a new light and power, enters into my own common feelings, a thoroughly honest straightforward writer in every respect, presenting me with a whole world of thought and speculations. Yet not in the way of thought or speculation either, but in the simplest, most practical manner, as connected with the every day doings and feelings of himself and his fellow creatures. That these thoughts and feelings are a mere artificial machinery devised for the improvement of his poem, is a notion so monstrous and ridiculous, so contrary to the plain facts of the case, so entirely confuted by the poet's age, and by the simplicity of his character, so evidently borrowed from the practice of poets, who have indeed contrived a machinery because they have been themselves mere machines, writing from no inward impulse, and working up every real thing into the artificial unmeaningness of their own minds, that any one who reads the poem, and entertains it, must have given both his heart and his understanding a holiday. These

thoughts must form the very staple of humanity; they have existed in all ages with more or less clearness, in proportion as men were more or less able to understand what is passing within them. Here I find them mixed up with much evident contradiction and absurdity, but they must have a meaning; what is that meaning? there must be something in them, what is that something? and thus these mighty subjects, the origin and source of the plagues and evils which we see in the world, the meaning of sacrifice, mediation, an invisible fellowship, besides that which exists on earth, temptation, the law of conscience, the foundations of national society, the connection of our intercourse with each other, and our intercourse with the invisible world, in a word, nearly every subject which enters into Theology, nearly every subject which enters into our Thirty-nine Articles, is inevitably suggested to every enquiring and meditative mind by the perusal of the Iliad. I say nearly all; for Lord Fitzwilliam will say, 'I do not see those subjects to which I particularly referred, as unfit for the consideration of Eton boys, and the House of Lords.' Perhaps not. I could easily prove that these subjects are necessarily involved in those which stand out on the very surface of the Homeric poems. But I will get at nothing in the way of inference and implication.

Homer, however, is not the only poet whose works boys fresh from Eton are in the habit of reading, and whose works the University of Oxford, as well as most other Universities, requires them to read. Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, are reckoned at Berlin and Bonn, and even in Edinburgh and London, fit subjects for youthful study; and I ask any one who has ever looked into any of those

authors, whether he can read a single play of any one of them, with the calm attention which is expected of a student, nay, with the sagacity which is looked for in an ordinary reader, without having this awful question of freedom and necessity presented to him, even thrust upon him? I should like to find a man who can honestly say, I have read a Greek play, and who does not know that this mighty problem was exercising the minds of its authors, and who does not see that each tragedy supposes, and is more or less palpably occupied, with this controversy? Who does not feel, that tragedy itself is unmeaning, and never could have had existence, if there had not been this problem, and if it did not disturb the thoughts of men, just in proportion as they thought or meditated at all? And how much a part of humanity this controversy is, how utterly impossible it is for a man not to feel an interest in it, unless he has plunged into the depths of sensuality, or hardened himself into an intellectual monster, who takes part in all disputations but has no sense of the real heart-question which is at the bottom of any, the student will become more and more aware, as he enters into the spirit of these writers, and especially as he compares them with each other. If he really understands these plays, written in the early ages of the world by men, who expressed what they knew to be the wants and cravings of man, and whom all subsequent ages, by adopting their works as a staple literature, have recognised in this respect as no pretenders to a knowledge which they did not possess, he must be exercised with this controversy, he must require conditions of thought for the conduct of his understanding, which do not pass it over, but deal manfully with it. For

no one who uses himself honestly can believe, that any of the thoughts and feelings which those poets have evoked in his mind, are satisfied by them, no one can say Æschylus and Sophocles have brought me to any comfortable solution of this mighty problem. They awaken me to doubts, anxieties, self-questionings. Thanks be to them for it, or rather thanks be to Him, who by such means, or by any means, will rouse up his creatures, his children, from the stupid slumbers of sense and selfishness, to ask what they are, and what He is. But such doubts, such questions, are not like those of the professional sceptic, doubts, for doubting sake; they are doubts which demand satisfaction, and which know that they have a right to it. Those teachers who begin with awakening them in their pupils' minds, without knowing that they have the means of answering them, soon repent of what seems but an act of wanton cruelty, and seek to lay the spirits which they have raised, charming some to rest with the vulgar incantation "this only means," and persuading others (most sage and logical counsellors!) to scorn the voice of reason and conscience, because thousands in all ages had been troubled with it before them. But Christian instructors have no such ignoble artifices for abating the longings and destroying the freedom of the human spirit. They know that there is a satisfaction for all these anxieties, a home and sabbath for the wearied spirit of man, an ark for the dove that has been hovering solitary and sad over waters, beneath which is lying a fair world, that is yet to come forth in its morning freshness and beauty. Such teachers know, that the explanation of all that the soul desires to know, after it has visited every gloomy abyss of thought, and

ascended every mount of speculation, is contained in that simple faith, into which the child is admitted at the font, and which it learns from a mother's lips.

The second department in the Oxford Course of Humanity is History. History means properly enquiring or asking questions. This was precisely the sense which Herodotus attached to the word. He found a great many facts around him which puzzled him, and he went about questioning what they meant. Now in this pretty child's book all those questions, which were suggested by the reading of Homer, come again before us, but in a new shape. There the question was, respecting thoughts and feelings, which we find rising up in men's minds the moment they are awakened to consciousness and self-reflection. *Here* the question is, respecting broad facts affecting the outward condition and relations of men. If Homer shewed me that men cannot feel or realize the possibility of association with each other, except in the belief of a connexion with some beings above them, I have the pictures of societies cohering by the recognition of such superior beings, and apparently exhibiting modifications of character, precisely corresponding to the nature of their faith. Here I have descriptions of hordes of shepherds, cemented by no policy, having no law but that of the family, and in their mythology, as it is delivered to me by the simple and honest narrator, I see nothing but traditions of departed heroes, or the worship of objects of direct sensible utility, with the highest mixture possible of awe and mystery, with the slightest mixture possible of grandeur and beauty. There I find a people, bound together by strong cords of allegiance to a sovereign, and of profound respect for a sacerdotal caste, accurately

partitioned into territorial nomes, and in all the arts which minister to animal life, most eminent; exhibiting reverence, subordination, and obedience, but seldom arising in their conceptions above the forms of brute nature, and never ascending into intellectual freedom. Not to question now how these features in the national character were connected with the slavish utilitarian character of their minds,—not to demand how yet this slavery consisted with a certain cultivation of letters, a certain portion of law, and a certain perception of art, which raised them above mere savage hordes,—seems impossible for any man who is studying with any sort of application and earnestness. And again, when he beholds a mighty empire, compacted and orderly, aptly arranged according to a fine scheme of subordination and interdependence, the people not outwardly unhappy, but exhibiting no moral energies or life; not to compare this state of things with the two last described,—not to enquire how the outward and inward condition of each may be affected by the faith of each,—not to compare the Priest of Memphis with the Magian of Susa,—not to enquire how their reverence for a vital, wonderful power, expressed in no images, suggesting thoughts to man of the most awful secret energies of nature, but unconnected with any of his own feelings or sympathies, acted on the feelings of the Persian, and produced a difference between him and the idolater of definite animal forms,—seems to imply an absence of all the qualities which are expected in a student.

And again, when there is exhibited to a student a free commonwealth—loose and incoherent, subject to perpetual vicissitudes, but yet full of power and energy and intellectual life—it seems hard to suppose that he

will not ask himself, what connection there is between this form of national development and that mythology, which brought men into direct and immediate connection with the gods, but which took from them nearly all their awfulness, (save what was preserved in the mysteries of Eleusis, which every Grecian patriot therefore held most precious,) in which the most splendid objects of nature were honoured, not as the manifestation of some hidden power, but as shrines of beatified human creatures, whose forms might be conceived by the imagination, and presented to the eye. Now whatever form these questions take, they must involve theology. It may be that you refer the worship entirely to the character or the circumstances of the people; but then, if history be true, if the facts do not deceive us, similar states of character, or similar circumstances, will produce similar results; and, whether they take precisely or not the shape in which we see them in ancient history, they must take some shape, with which it is important for us to be acquainted. The mythological forms may be departed for ever, at least from our own land, but the notions which produced those forms cannot have departed, unless we have ceased to be men. To understand then what these notions are, how they bear upon each other, how they have affected society, must even on this, the lowest view of the case, be part of the questionings of the historical student. But then, if he is to be guided in these questionings, if he is to set out with a chart of his journey, these subjects must find a place in that chart, they must be taken notice of in the conditions of thought which are framed for his direction.

That we may not build entirely on one history, let

us turn to Rome. In that compact society, where the energies of human character and the power of human law became so mighty, are we not independent of mythological phenomena? Not certainly if we look at the simple facts of that remarkable story. Let a man enter upon the study of Roman history with the determination to avoid the impertinent intrusion of questionings which lead him straight into theology; and he must close his books, or read them with the vacancy of an idiot. How can he help seeing, that a reverence as profound, as that which was exacted from the Magian for a natural object, was paid by the Roman to a moral being; a being, not more distinguished from the intellectual objects of Athenian worship, than from the Spartan deity, who was a god of arbitrary order; whereas the Roman Jupiter (Ζεῦ πάτερ) was the founder and upholder of all actual order and relationship? How can he put together the reverence for paternal authority,—the unceasing fire of Vesta (Hestia), the goddess of domestic ties,—the tradition of the origin of the state in a son rescuing his father and the household gods from destruction,—or the myriad facts, of which nearly every one of the exquisite stories which embellish and almost form the history of Livy supplies an instance, demonstrating that the organization and permanence of the Roman state altogether depended on the reverence for family ties,—and not observe how that reverence was interwoven with the character of the national mythology? Or can he go forward to the age of Cicero—the age in which luxury had destroyed in great part these family feelings, when divorce, as the history of the great orator itself shews, was an event of constant occurrence, and when political morality, as his letters bear too faithful

witness, was a forgotten name among all but two or three of the old Roman aristocrats—can he help comparing these facts with the moral and theological writings of the same persons, and observing how the quick-eyed sceptics of that age, perceiving the absurdities of the popular machinery in which the truth of a God of Righteousness was embodied, began to believe that the whole was an invention of state-craft, to be used indeed, but with a thorough comprehension on the part of wise men that it was not meant for them. How these different opinions and states of mind bear upon each other; how much they had to do with the downfall of the republic, and with the establishment of a Divine Imperator, a God-king, reigning not by divine *right*, but more or less as a divine *person;* must surely be points that suggest themselves to every thinking reader, and questions, surely, not unworthy of those who are destined to be legislators. Possibly if some bearing that name had meditated upon them a little more diligently, we might have been saved a good deal of flimsy argumentation, and some very stale common places, tricked out in a new and fashionable garment. Possibly they might have found, that the connection between the faith of a state and its political existence was not one, which has been started in modern days by Churchmen, but is one which has occupied the thoughts of men, ever since men could think at all. It requires no great liveliness of apprehension to discover, that religion may be used to serve the purposes of interested statesmen, or even that a system of religion is necessary to keep up good order and government. Either of them is the ordinary conclusion of the most careless and heartless reader of history; but they, who are weary of schemes, weary of

systems, anxious to understand facts, to understand themselves, are busy with a different problem; they are asking themselves, what is a nation, how does it consist, by what is it upheld? they know it has a foundation deeper than the crude theories of sophists, or the omnipotent decrees of the Houses of Parliament. They know that legislators can lay no foundation, can erect no constitution; all they can do is, to learn what the foundation, what the constitution is; and having that learning, to take such measures as shall uphold it, or destroy it. To gain this learning is the object of history; those who have it not will find, when the great conflict comes, that they cannot steer their course aright, or save their country, or even their lands, from destruction, by all their tricks, and doublings, and courtings of a triumphant mob. Therefore I contend, that we should continue to impart such knowledge to future legislators, and that we should continue to impose on them such conditions of thought, as we find will enable them to receive it effectually.

Before I conclude this section, however, I ought to mention, that, if I had chosen to diverge from the plan which I proposed to myself of considering what questions arise naturally out of the study of ancient authors, and, if I had supposed any student to read, as it is probable most real Oxford students will read, modern histories not written by Churchmen, but by those most opposed to all Churchmanship, by the writers of modern France and Germany, then I should have stumbled much more directly upon those very questions to which Lord Fitzwilliam alluded, for there is no man who is the least acquainted with those modern schools, but knows that questions of

liberty and necessity connect themselves, not accidentally and collaterally with their histories, but from the actual ground-work of them. Whether therefore we turn to ancient narrations of facts, or to modern systems of histories, to whatever point we fly, in order to avoid these intricate and embarrassing questions, they will pursue us; we cannot get rid of them; we must face them.

The student of Ethics at Oxford uses for his text book a work which is not the production of any Churchmen, but which has been bequeathed to us by the Schools of Greece. The experiment then in this case also is a fair one. If Christian Theology be required to clear any difficulties which he raises, it is difficult to suppose that there has been any collusion or priestcraft to cause that it should be so. Now I am bold to affirm, that he does raise such difficulties as nothing but Theology can solve; and those, difficulties, which cannot be passed over, which must be fairly encountered, if we are not willing to be cowardly, feeble, and slavish students.

There is a parodox which meets us in the very outset of the Nicomachean Ethics. It is entwined with the very roots of the author's system. It is not discovered by a laborious collation of paragraphs. Aristotle even forces it upon our attention. He tells us not once or twice, but again and again, that moral habits presume moral energies, and that moral energies presume moral habits. It would be very delightful to an anxious student, who, in obedience to Aristotle's own repeated commands, is viewing the subject not abstractedly, but in reference to his own state and conduct, if he could believe that this was a circle described through some inadvertency by his skilful and

watchful master. But he cannot believe it. The more he reflects upon what passes within him, the more he perceives that the circle is in nature, is in himself. By one brought into the perplexed and wretched state of mind which the discovery produces, who feels that he has the sea before and the armies of Egypt behind,—that he must have habits, but that he is utterly inconstant and irregular,—that in order to obtain them he must have energies, but that he is weaker than a child,—I should have a chance of being listened to with something of affectionate attention if I told him, that, without taking that dreadful alternative to which I know he is often tempted, of convincing himself, as, alas! he too soon may, that he *has* energies and can *create* habits by becoming a determined sensualist, there is a way for him into satisfaction upon that, which is to him the most real and amazing difficulty. I do not believe that such a person will utterly scout me as a mystical prater, if I remind him of words which he has often heard, and once perhaps with a kind of pleasure, but which of late, since they seemed big with unrealized meaning, have fallen upon a dull impatient ear; such words I mean as these, "He shall put on righteousness as a cloak; he shall clothe himself with them (moral graces) as a bride adorneth herself with jewels;" such phrases as form a sort of ground to all the imagery of Scripture, and are explained by a number of expressions in which there is no imagery;—if I tell him that these words are no mere Eastern flourishes; for that, even if he did not believe them to be inspired by the Spirit of Truth, as a means of imparting truth to men, yet peculiar diction can never be found in any good poetry except for the purpose of revealing some latent meaning;—if I urge him to trace the re-

currence of similar phraseology in another language where he is no longer surrounded by an atmosphere of poetry, in calm letters, amidst subtle argumentation and practical admonition, the authors of these telling us moreover, that they are speaking of the same object which was seen afar off in those earlier raptures, now brought nigh to the apprehensions of men;—if I shew him that this idea of clothing[a] or putting on the goodness or beauty of another—attracted to us, and made entirely our own, yet by some other law than that of natural appropriation—does alone fulfil the idea of *habits* which Aristotle sets forth, which conscience witnesseth—telling us too sadly, that it is by our hearts delighting in some impure object that they become partakers of its properties,—a truth, to which language itself, streaked as it so often is with the light of truths just rising above the horizon, does, not only in the ordinary acceptation of the word among ourselves, but no less if we trace it to its root where it coincides with the cognate word in Greek, most abundantly testify. And then, if, while he is already beginning to perceive that another truth is necessary to sustain this, while he is beginning to wish that the ἕξεις, the havings or holdings of the inner man, may be found to be under the same head with the ἐνέργειαι, the power therein inwrought, I shew him that it is actually so; that, if any thing be inwrought, there must be an inworker; that to reflect upon our processes of thought and not dream of such a worker is impossible; that, if we cannot help referring natural life or intellectual to Him as a giver, it is strange to

[a] ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον· Eph. iv. 24. *cf.* Col. iii. 10. Gal. iii. 27. Col. iii. 9.

doubt that moral life, the ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν, can have any other origination; I do not question but that his own spirit, awakened to hope, will carry him over some other steps in the argument, that he will perceive that what in nature seems a hopeless mystery, forbidding all access and interpretation, has its ground in a mystery with which we may have fellowship, a mystery, in which it is no distressing paradox but holy repose to believe that He, whom we behold as an object, and He, who acts in us as a power, are "neither afore, neither after the other[b]." I do not doubt that his practical hope of coming himself to moral habits of high-heartedness, meekness, freedom, gracefulness, courage, with others that Aristotle scarcely dreamed of, yea, even to those dianoetic habits of which St. Paul speaks continually, wisdom, prudence, good counsel, practical reason, grows proportionately with his advancement in the discovery; and (which he now perceives to be the all important difference) without the feeling of selfish realization, seeing that they are all contemplated, admired, enjoyed as the beauty and glory of another who must increase as he decreases. Nor, lastly, do I doubt, that thus beginning to feel himself a man, he will look one step higher, and will feel that the mighty object, in whom he contemplates all goodness, must be the manifestation,—and the mighty power, who began all good energies within him, (and whose personality he can as little question as his own,) must be the living Spirit,—of an absolute Being, good in himself, the only source of all good, and its only end. But such thoughts as those, however necessarily arising out of the book which

[b] Creed of St. Athanasius.

we use, though the whole meaning of them is *expressed* in that Creed which children pronounce every Sunday, and though they are formally set forth in reference to intellectual studies and difficulties in our Articles, will seem strange to those whom some internal discipline has not prepared to receive them.

I will pass to another point which the most practical man in our day cannot put from him, saying, I am not concerned in this; the question, in what sense Ethics are related to Politics; which is not a point, as far as I know, directly set forth by Aristotle, but which is in so many ways suggested to his thoughtful readers—by the first words of his book, by the conclusion of it, by the celebrated comparison of contemplative with political life, by the whole context of the treatise—that to pass over it would argue a strange want of insight or zeal. He seems to speak of the science of Ethics, as a vestibule or porch to the science of Politics, and in some measure as a part of that science, as if, though it had a distinct work, its grounds were in politics. Hence the advocates of the doctrine of general consequences, those who think that the actions of a man are to be determined by their probable effects on society, claim him as a man, not indeed thoroughly comprehending their views, but, for his age, rarely illuminated. On the other hand, those, who believe that the culture of the individual life is the great work which man is to pursue—a work, which he must carry on without reference to society, though society will ultimately reap the fruits of it—allege Aristotle's notion of happiness and of virtue as decisive evidences, in spite of some inconvenient expressions, that he in the main thought with them. An unprejudiced reader will, I think, adopt

some such conclusion as this. Aristotle believed that there must be a polity before there could be ethical cultivation, for he considered education, and that imparted by the state, as every thing; he believed also that there must be ethical cultivation or there could be no polity. He found both these facts, and he left them; he dared not suppress either, because each was so; he would have been glad to reconcile them, if he could; but he was content to adopt the best practical course with the knowledge he possessed. This was the general temper of his mind. Besides being one of the keenest of observers, he was also one of the most faithful of reporters; sometimes theorizing upon facts, scarcely ever theorizing away facts. He had none of that heaven-aspiring spirit of Plato, who, keeping his eyes upon a spot in the heavens where the yet unrisen sun must be, soared aloft to meet him, and caught from him, it may be, some warmth and healing; he had no such care to explain the confusions and anomalies of earth as would tempt him to such flights, or at least no such hope of finding an explanation. He felt himself bound in by certain conditions; how they came, he could not tell; they were, and how should we act under them. As each philosophy was by turns prevalent in the Church, we see the effect of the two methods. The Platonic period gave birth to the Arian controversy. The commencement of the Pelagian was the sign that Aristotle had begun to supersede him. Each of these periods is a lesson to us how we should use these philosophers. The first, as leading us to apprehend the spiritual wants which are in us, which revelation must satisfy. The second, as shewing what outward difficulties there are in our position, which a revelation

should account for. Great, I believe, is the service which Aristotle may render to a student in this age; especially by leading him away from one-sided speculations to the observation of what there is actually in nature, which gives a plausibility, nay a reasonableness to each. So here, I am presented with a theory of general consequences. Study, say the supporters of this theory, what effect your actions will produce on yourself and on society, and regulate them accordingly. Again, I am presented with a theory of individual life. Strive to regulate your mind according to the right standard; actions will follow, which will be useful to yourself and society. In each of these there seems something, for which conscience and reason testify, and something, against which they testify,—*for* this in the first, that it does not suppose a man can by possibility act as if he were a creature separated from mankind and acting without reference to them,—*for* this in the second, that it acknowledges actions to originate, where we feel that they do originate, in states of mind,—*against* this in the first, that he must either suppose a power of producing states of mind by a mere exercise of the power of calculation, contrary to experience, or he actually substitutes the tendency of an action for the source of it, contrary to all reason,—*against* this in the second, that it either supposes a man living not surrounded with others, contrary to fact, or that he can regulate his states of mind as if this were not the case contrary to reason. Wherefore, I think, we are driven off both these schemes to those facts which are the justification of each. Man is in society, each man is a distinct, living, responsible man. It would seem that this is a fact of our constitution; but we must

understand that constitution in order to explain it. Aristotle did not understand it; and it would seem that neither do our modern philosophers of different descriptions understand it, otherwise they would leave speculations and unfold it to us. If they will tell us what the constitution for man as man is; what that constitution is, which is above every national constitution, and is the only ground of it, we will listen to them. This is the very point Plato wanted to know,—Aristotle wanted to know,—we want to know. This is the very question, which, in different ways, this age is asking itself. This is the question, which we see stirring in the minds of theoretical men, who have devised the schemes of Benthamism and St. Simonism. This is the question which is practically at work in the minds of our mechanics and handicraftsmen who form political unions. Tell us then the secret, if you know it. If you cannot, we will tell you. We have been telling it to the children in our charity schools these many years past. We teach them out of the Catechism, that they are children of God, members of Christ, heirs of the kingdom of heaven. We expound to them what we believe to be that universal constitution for man as man. We believe that we are admitted by baptism into this constitution, and laid under an obligation of making it known to other men as intended also for them. We believe that a man not understanding this constitution, attempting to set up a separate individual life, does divest himself of his glory as a man, does not fulfil the duties of a man. We believe that the man, who, receiving the good news that there is this constitution, and renouncing and repenting of the selfish life he has led, living as if he were personally related to the head of the polity, rejoicing to

think that he is so, (because he is a man, and not because he is any particular man,) does rise to a feeling of personal distinctness which he can never get in any other way, and which is so essential to his being, that all moral or spiritual cultivation without it is impossible. Here we say the difficulty is reconciled; and, because this great question rises out of the subject of Ethics, according to the method in which we pursue it,—because it is necessary for our well being that it should be solved,—because it is the most cardinal controversy of this day,—therefore, we say that conditions of thought setting forth the truth, which alone expounds it, are indispensable to the ethical student.

But surely, if I have been ever so successful in persuading myself that theological conditions of thought are necessary for the three mixed sciences, I must be content to exempt from their control the pure sciences of Philology and Logic. Whether they would, either of them, be better studied if they obtained this independence, is a question which the following considerations may help us to answer.

By Philology I understand that study which deals with words in reference to their meaning. It is in this respect the opposite of Logic, which, strictly speaking, is not concerned with the meaning of words at all. The one uses human discourse as a mean of attaining to a knowledge of human thought and feeling; the other explains the conditions, under which human discourse is possible. That such a study as that of language should form a prominent, nay the most prominent, subject in a course of Humanity, would seem self-evident to any one who considered what language is; that it is the very sign and organ of

Humanity, the bond of human policy and fellowship. That it should be pursued in such a method as would most clearly manifest for what purpose it is pursued, as would leave a student least at liberty to imagine that it is undertaken for mere sordid, secular ends, as would most directly conduct him not to what is accidental or peculiar in the habits of any nation, but to the permanent roots of humanity upon which their habits must have grown, seems also most necessary and rational. Yet no one who is acquainted with society can be ignorant that these principles, so far from being generally recognized, are for the most part scouted. Wise men of the earth say at their tables and tell their sons, that there is no imaginable reason, but the will and caprice of certain priests, why two dead languages (so they are pleased to call them) should for so many years be objects of wearisome devotion to the youth of this land.

Acting upon these admonitions, a young man often comes to the University with a tolerable endowment of school learning, and an easy knack of composition, intending to read the Greek and Latin poets and orators, but thoroughly determined, as he says, to eschew all derivations and particles. By discarding minute questions about words and constructions, he fancies that he shall have much more time as well as capacity to enjoy the actual beauties of great classical authors. The notion is highly plausible, but, strange to say, it does not maintain its ground long. The life and the poetry, which the student was to have obtained in such essential pureness, by some means or other very speedily evaporate. He loses his admiration for them; begins to fancy that there *is* some propriety in connecting the study of language with

them, for that language constitutes their only just title to fame; and determines to seek for his models elsewhere. But in reading the famous poets of England's best days, he is puzzled to find something of a similar feeling to that, which induced him to throw aside his classical favourites. He is oppressed in the presence of Milton with the sense of being near one, who has yoked his mind to stern laws; who into those thoughts, which 'voluntary move harmonious numbers,' has suffered no freak of taste, no unquestioned or disorderly impulse to intrude. In Shakspeare, whom he hoped to find a chartered libertine, there is the same sense of obedience sustaining power in the production of language, which had scarcely surprised him in the most learned of poets. To those therefore of modern schools, who have not suffered their free genius to be cramped by servile regard to order and reason, he betakes himself, and with them for a time he is satisfied. But presently he discovers that amusement, which he has ascertained to be the object of poetry and literature, is not the object of existence. To those practical subjects, therefore, with which the age is occupied, he now, and, as he hopes, finally, gives himself up, rejoicing that he has at length found a comfortable port after his very weary and useless travel. Amidst the realities of politics and political reasoning, he is surely safe from those idle questions about words, from which, while surrounded by a scholastic atmosphere, he found it hardly possible to escape. A short time undeceives him. He desires to enlighten his countrymen respecting the tricks, by which men, interested to hide from them sound information, draw them into various unprofitable reflections upon subjects nowise concerning their

happiness. But he finds that certain *words* exercise an inexplicable influence over the minds of his pupils, an influence, which all the demonstrations of his philosophy cannot overreach. Nay he fears that some of these words do secretly hold a certain government over his own feelings and judgment. Just at this crisis of his mind he takes up the Diversions of Purley, a book which he knew very well before, but had never studied. Here is the solution of all his difficulties! Here is a guide to all the traps and pitfalls which beset the philosopher's path! What a clear satisfactory self-proving system! So healthy and invigorating, the very elixir of intellectual life! What an admirable test it supplies for all the impositions which cunning priests or well-meaning moralists have fathered upon the world! The oppressive notion of an absolute *Truth* (fruitful cause of religious intolerance) dissolves into the trowings of each particular mind. *Right*, that fine fiction of Ethics, becomes the ordinance of a supreme power. Nor need the application of the system be limited to words of Teutonic origin. *Conscience*, what is it but knowing together with some one else, the word setting forth (how clearly!) the true doctrine that the mind of each man is a watch, the index of which, owing to some secret cooperation of outward accidents with the spring, is ever faithfully pointing to that hour, which the notions of the class he lives in have settled to be the true one? Such clear demonstrations may resist all confutations save one: the laborious corrector of other men's notions, while he is occupied with *them* will never even suspect a flaw in his scheme. But, if some sudden sickness or sorrow should bring him into conflict with himself, he will find that Tooke's are indeed

'winged words,' which take flight and desert the soul in its extremity. What avails it that he has anatomized the word Conscience in his closet, if he be confronted by a living and real reprover, who upbraids him, in language which he knows it is self-deception *not* to hear, not with having defied the notions of his class, but with having crouched to them too slavishly? What avails it that Right has been proved a mere ordinance of power, which the same power could therefore repeal, if the deep consciousness of Wrong in him tells him that there must be Law, from which he has departed, and which cannot pass away until Evil and Confusion become omnipotent? What avails it that he knows the word Truth to mean nothing, if a miserable sense of Falseness in all the judgments of his understanding, all the desires of his heart, convinces him, that there is a reality fixed and unshaken, and the most contrary to any thing that he troweth?

Now if I may suppose my imaginary student actually to pass through this awful process; and may please myself with the belief that he comes out of it, "a wiser and a sadder man," and yet withal a happy and joyful man, one who has apprehended the possibility and the fact of a reconciliation between himself and the Everlasting Righteousness and Love with which he was at war, and has practically entered into this belief; it is not difficult to guess the feelings with which, for some time after this transition, he will regard the study which had betrayed him into so many errors. He will loathe Etymology in all its forms, as only another name for opposition to every thing sacred, inward, and actual. Every reference to the derivation of a word as a test of its use he will fly from, as a contrivance to cheat him out of some good thing,

which, so long as he holds fast by common sense and avoids Metaphysics, he shall be able to retain. Alas! he soon discovers his delusion. As he becomes more acquainted with the different compartments of the religious world, he finds there are other evils, beside that dreaded one of Metaphysics, which threaten the sincerity of his heart and of his profession. With simple confidence he had taken the currency of each sect, not fancying any adulteration; but, when he begins to weigh them in the balances of the sanctuary, how many does he find light and hollow! How many words does he hear in religious circles, which, he knows, mean almost nothing! how many more, which, he suspects, mean something different in the mouths of two persons, who are nevertheless holding fancied communion, too generally a communion of hostility to some third party, by means of them! He has an indescribable sense of imposition, vagueness, confusion in his understanding and his heart. Words, words, words, seem to be ever flying about him, like locusts, and to darken the heaven above and the earth beneath. Oh! that his ears could be closed against all (that is called) intelligible discourse; that he could hear nothing but the roaring of the sea, the singing of birds, a few simple tunes, and the inconscious prattle of infancy! But this cannot be, and the momentary rebellion against the gracious appointments of God, which was implied in the wish, turns into shame and self-humiliation, when he remembers that possibly his own past wilfulness may be the cause of his present perplexities.

'Is it not possible,' he may now ask himself, 'that a foresight, and, if a foresight, doubtless an experience, of the slavery into which words may bring the soul, and

of the freedom which that man enjoys, who is their master and not their tool, may have led our ancestors to make that study which, at the University, he abandoned as not belonging to practical life, the groundwork of their education?' I think it is not improbable, that a person brought to this conviction would after all this experience return to those inquiries which might have saved him from it. And if he does, I believe he will be abundantly rewarded. If he determines to abstain entirely from theories, and honestly and experimentally to examine the actual facts of language, they will, I am persuaded, guide him into more acquaintance with himself and his fellow men, than all the Newspapers and Magazines and the (so called) books of useful knowledge. They will more tend to settle him in the assurance that he is a spiritual being; to make him feel that he is bound by an invisible chain to the past and the future, to teach him that there must be a bond of universal fellowship and brotherhood, and that bond not a natural but a spiritual one; they will more tame his understanding, which is ever struggling to shake off the pleasant fetters of the spirit, to docility and subjection than any other human study. Wherefore it was in this discipline that our elder men were especially exercised. They did not, with Johnson, believe that a word in one application is no more of kin to the same word in a different application than to any other in the language; their reason, nay, their sense, instructed by their reason, rebelled against so strange a supplication. Neither did they, with Horne Tooke, believe, that a word has indeed a root, but that it never grows from that root; that its meaning in reference to the loftiest subject, where alone we see it in its fulness

and perfection, should do homage to its lowest use, and be governed by the laws of that use[n]. Marking these two errors, the student will launch forth into a broad ocean of discovery. A single word will serve him for many a long and profitable meditation. How delightful it is to observe the word χάρις preserving so long its twofold meaning of kindness conferred, and thanks returned; yet we know not how to reconcile them, till the Apostle invests the word with a meaning in which he establishes their homogeneity,—the acting power of grace itself producing the re-acting energy of gratitude! How much may be learned by studying the word Καταλλαγή, if we only be solemnly careful not to restrict the last lofty meaning by its previous earthly or commercial meanings, but will rather look to see them borrowing a light and glory from the word in its transfigured state, after it has been spiritualized! And, lastly, what unfathomable abysses of thought does the word Λόγος disclose to the meditation of a humble and earnest student! It is impossible to describe what a suddenness, what a reality there is in some of these discoveries, (discoveries, I mean, not because they are literally new, but because they are so to each fresh student,) nor how entirely for a time they may possess and overpower the mind; for no one can

[n] The course of the Arian heresy is an exemplification of the natural working of this principle of Horne Tooke's system. Arius commenced his heresy by taking the *literal* and *material* sense of the words *Father* and *Son* as the basis of a logical argument, and he was led on to deny their *primary* and *essential* signification, and ultimately to reduce them to a mere metaphor. And yet it is said Theology has nothing to do with Philology: correctness in science is quite independent of orthodoxy in doctrine. See Newman's Arians of the Fourth Century, cap. ii. §. v.

help feeling, that they are connected with some of those deep and potent truths which most concern Humanity, and which we are toiling all our lives to find. Connected they doubtless are, closely and intimately connected, as the shadows which we cast from our bodies are connected with those bodies, and with the sun that is shining in the heavens. But, alas! the shadows may be mistaken for substances; those wonderful facts of Philology which indicate great truths, and which could not exist if those truths were not, may be confounded by the vain and darkened spirit of men with the truths themselves. Often has it happened so to the Physiologist; he has been crushed under the power and weight of the analogies to spiritual truths which were every where meeting him in his natural researches. He has watched the tracks of a divine spirit in every living form and substance with intense ardour and delight, till he has lost all sense of the reality and absoluteness of Him of whose presence they are the tokens. And so too, not rarely, it comes to pass with the Philologist. He, too, has sight of a ladder which is set upon earth, and is reaching to heaven: he, too, is liable to be so bewildered with the mere feeling of this connection as to lose all sense of his own insignificance, all the adoring humility which exclaims, "how dreadful is this place!" In this state of mind he is ready for those fancies and superstitions which always haunt the mind when it has become idolatrously attached to any one pursuit, however noble, when it has begun "to sacrifice unto its own net, and burn incense to its own drag." Many a gloomy page in the history of Philosophy, and in the history of the Church many a project of foul fanaticism, which has distracted mankind, but which began in the

earnest pursuit of some truth, or in the delightful discovery of some reflections cast from her perfect image, is made plain to a student of Philology by his own experience. He feels how easy it is to commit the same error, and how very difficult is the deliverance from it; for neither the evidence of those that have not studied at all—nor the grave rebuke of those who see his error, but have no sympathy with his truth—nor all the other contrivances by which men torment each other into wisdom and rectitude—can in this, as in other cases, otherwise than aggravate the evil. Outward sorrow awakening a sense of inward misery, of dreariness and heartlessness, is the medicine generally ordained by Him who answers the complaints of men's spirits out of the whirlwind, when his friends and comforters have been "darkening counsel by words without knowledge;" and none who have felt the disease will deny that it is a gentle and gracious remedy. But if this be the most usual cure, is it impossible or unwise to administer medicines, which may prevent or check both this and the other forms of disease to which I have alluded? The question cannot be an unimportant one; for though it be granted that few individuals pass through all the states of mind into which my student came; yet it is certain that there will be found in a University a class representing each of these states of mind. Nay, I believe a University must be *composed* of persons, who either neglect Philology in obedience to the fashion of the day,—or neglect it from religious scruples and fears,—or pursue it on the materialist ground of Horne Tooke,—or pursue it on the spiritual ground of our old philosophers and divines. Now for each of these classes I affirm not only that theological conditions of thought are useful, but that

no other provision would be equally useful, or would at all meet the case.

The members of the first class are wrong in this; they have never asked themselves, What is a University? What is study? What is education? They have never understood that education is from first to last a conflict with that notion of sensible utility, which is the natural notion of all men; which every savage holds of course, and which is reproduced as a refined novelty whenever civilization, advancing in a tortuous direction, touches at its extreme point the confines of barbarism. Practically to impress this fact upon the minds of students—to shew that, while the whole vocation of a University teacher is to overturn the doctrine that the worth of any thing is to be determined by its direct sensible advantages, he is yet no mere *littérateur*—that every thing he does is done with a view to an end—we must offer some sign, that our *Literæ Humaniores* are indeed what their name imports; that we prosecute each and all of them, as means to a knowledge of ourselves and of man; as means to the formation of a manly character. Now, I say, we cannot do this, by imposing Poetical conditions of thought, or Historical, or Philological; we can only do it by imposing the conditions of a science which manifestly concerns Humanity as such, and in which it discovers its own foundation and laws. And that this science is Theology, is no exclusively Christian doctrine, but is proved by the testimony of all the cultivated nations of the ancient world, and of all philosophy, save that which, as in this instance, we have shewn to be self-destructive, and tending to barbarism. Supposing then the student of the first division should derive an advantage from our Articles

themselves; supposing that by despising he should be incapable of understanding them; yet the imposition of them in the University, when he knows why they are imposed, will be a perpetual memento to him of the real purpose for which the body to which he belongs prosecutes its studies, and of the purpose for which he must prosecute them, if he wishes to go forth a more honest and wiser man than he entered it.

For the second class, the religious men, theological articles, really studied and understood, will surely preserve them, if any thing can, from that contempt of Philology, into which we have seen that some of them through misapprehension are betrayed. Solemn indeed are the warnings which they hold out to preserve a religious man from indifference to the advantages for following this study, which Providence has placed within his reach. They will shew him that numberless heresies, which have darkened the face of heaven and spread pestilence over the earth, have been bred in the carcases of words, from which the life had been suffered to escape by those who were appointed to watch over their preservation and their purity. And they will warn him, by the peril of his own soul, by the peril of the souls entrusted to him, to beware lest, through self-willed negligence, the like should happen in our own day, even to his and their infinite confusion.

The third class, the Horne Tooke etymologists, are not in general aware that there is a *petitio principii* at the root of their whole system. They do not know, at least a great part of them do not, that the simple materiality of man is not proved by their master, but taken for granted. How so? Because, there being two sets of phenomena in language, one distinctly

proving man to be connected with an outward and visible world, and the other seeming at first sight to prove that he is connected with an invisible world, Tooke has assumed, that it is right and necessary to refer all the latter class of phenomena to the acknowledged laws of the former. Why? The obvious, admitted violence is justifiable only on the principle, that man is *more* likely to be only a creature of sense and matter; and therefore that, if by a little effort language *can* be persuaded not to resist this hypothesis, the effort ought to be made. Now if you can make a student feel in full force that this is begging a point which all his entreaties will not induce us to grant him for an instant; if you can make him feel that he is—not proving, but—taking for granted *that* to be false which all nations, in proportion as they were educated, have believed to be true; if you can shew him that, when he has lost this postulatum, his system, so far as it is exclusive and differs from that of other Etymologists, vanishes into air; you will act more practically upon his mind, than by special pleading all the details of Tooke's work. But how can you do this, unless you shew him that the foundation of your own instructions are laid in the acknowledgment and assertion of man's spiritual being, which assertion is not made unless you declare Theology to be the groundwork of Humanity and of all studies concerning Humanity?

Lastly, for the student of the fourth class, who is pursuing Philology steadily and in the right method, yet is liable to the danger of raising it out of its due place, nothing is so much needed as some document which sets outwardly and palpably before him mysteries of which he will meet with continual hints and

intimations while he is studying language. The habit of presenting these to himself as substantial verities, will impart a quickness, an ardour, an honest boldness, to his researches, which the men of this age never exhibit; and he will be saved from the error of substituting proofs of things, for things themselves, the signs of divinity in language for the Everlasting Word Himself. Left to his own caprices in a German University, I believe a young man, very earnest in philological pursuits, is likely sooner or later to become the tenant of a lunatic asylum, unless he should have the more wretched fate of being the founder of some new metaphysical theory, in which

> Nothing is, but all things seem,
> And we the shadows of the dream—

whereas, fortified at the outset with strong and manly conditions of thought, he may become a deliverer of his age from many of its confusions and superstitions, and the assertor of stern and living realities.

My chief object in the discussion on Philology was to prove, that a pure science, connected with Humanity, should be subjected to such conditions of thought as apply to the whole subject of Humanity, and not to any particular department of it. This argument is also applicable to Logic. Nevertheless it may be expedient to bring forward a few facts, from the records of the present age, and of past ages, which seem to establish this position respecting the study immediately under our consideration.

Twenty years ago, Logic was generally spoken of by liberal men as a study too useless and antiquated

for any meridian but that of Oxford. Now their opinions are altogether changed. The most University-hating priest-hating sect in England has taken Logic under its patronage; and scholastic pedantries, which would have furnished playwrights in the last age with excellent jokes against College Fellows, are now oftentimes the youthful Utilitarian's best passport to reputation.

Logic being then recognized by these dictators as a reasonable study, the questions become additionally important, To what end should it be pursued? In what manner? The end which the Benthamites propose to themselves, is the detection of fallacies in the writings or speeches of Whigs, Tories, and, above all, of Churchmen. We heartily wish them good speed in this work which they have assigned themselves; every honest man is thankful for being detected in a fallacy, and wishes that it should be exposed; the fallacies of dishonest men should be made known, for the sake of society and of truth. But we question much, whether the constant habit of looking out for fallacies, is the best qualification for discovering or correcting them. We have known some whose diligence, as fallacy-hunters, was most exemplary; whose contempt for their opponents could scarcely be equalled; but whose skill many, who fell far short of them in the two former merits, might, we think, easily have surpassed. They had a few logical formulas ready for every occasion; they talked much of subjecting their adversary's argument to a rigid analysis; they could shew very clearly that two facts because they coexist, are not therefore necessarily connected as cause and effect; and by all their contrivances, not unassisted, certainly, by that abounding compassion for the feeble-

ness of all who differed from them, to which I have alluded, they would beget very considerable astonishment and admiration in that portion of their auditors, which had implicitly adopted all their opinions beforehand. But if on returning from one of these exhibitions, you asked yourself, What has he done? What has he proved? He has shewn that certain persons have not *proved* the fact to be, as we and our countrymen generally think that it is. But his admirers believe, to a man, that he has shewn, not that the alleged fact or opinion *may not* be true, but that it *is not* true; nor, unless he had some notion of the same kind himself, could he, with such easy assurance, have laid down a series of dogmata not conceded, as he well knows, by any of his opponents, and not established by him. The warrant of such assumption was his belief that he had already wiped out all saws of books, all forms and pressures past, and that he had now a *tabula rasa*, upon which he might write what characters he pleased.

There is a fallacy, a staring fallacy, which we affirm that the Benthamites are practising, not now and then but continually, upon themselves and upon others. I do not take notice of it for the sake of confuting them, but of shewing to what grievous errors we are liable, if we set up Logic as an ἐμπειρία for the accomplishment of a specific purpose, instead of studying it as a branch of Humanity.

As Benthamism is from first to last a system of checks and limitations, it was inevitable that a study like Logic, which is definitive and not vital, which presents us with no principles of Discourse, but only teaches what conditions being violated, Discourse is impossible and contradictory, was sure to find favour

with its professors. It was equally sure to be despised by those who, having much superficial cleverness, find themselves quite able to sustain an argument, and to give it many sharp edges, without any knowledge of rules and formalities. Such a faculty, especially in this day, is most common; almost every person who has joined a little reading of newspapers, especially of debates and cross examinations, to a little acquaintance with society, and a tolerable memory and quickness of association, possesses it. If once, therefore, we are betrayed into the folly of supporting the claims of Logic upon the false pretence, that no argumentative adroitness is to be acquired without it; if we are even very anxious to deny that this adroitness may in part, and for a time at least, be diminished by the habits of mind which this study will create; we shall find ourselves continually and successfully confuted. These pious frauds by which persons are seduced into study, ought surely to be at once and for ever abandoned. It is a blessing, I think, if we are convinced that they were always dishonest, by finding that they are now useless. And thus we are again driven back upon the principle of our whole University system, that of considering this large study as unfolding some page in the great book of Self Knowledge and Human Knowledge, for which principle the imposition of Theological Articles is the grand abiding witness, and which is renounced the moment we throw them aside. But, apart from the assertion of this principle, we have direct evidence, that no central power which is not obtained from Theology, can avail to preserve Logic from becoming dangerous to the student, and destructive to every other branch of knowledge.

Let my readers, I mean the junior members of the

University, for whom alone on these points, at least, I can venture to write, reflect for a few moments upon a subject, which if it seem dry or profitless, does so, I believe, because we have been used to treat it as belonging to a past age, and have not considered, in how many of the questions most deeply concerning all classes now it is directly involved[b]; I mean, the controversy of the Realists and Nominalists. Stated plainly, the position of each side seems to be this. I hear the names dog, horse, man; I know that they describe various individual dogs, horses, men. But Scripture tells me, and Reason ratifies the words, that every thing was created after its kind. I cannot without the greatest violence divest myself of this feeling—no nor of this, that the name is a *sign* and *proof* that each of these individuals belongs to a kind. On this ground the Realist stood, and it is a ground which neither Abelard, nor Locke, nor all the philosophers on earth, can deprive him of, for it is a ground of reason and fact. But what edifice did he raise upon this ground? The conclusion that the name was, not the sign, the proof positive that there is a kind, but that the name is itself the kind. Here was death to all science, all discovery. That was

[b] Take one or two instances. The nearly most important chapter in so popular a book as that of Mr. Lyell on Geology is almost unintelligible without some knowledge of this controversy; The merits or defects of Cuvier's entire method. This for Physics. Next for Morals; 1. The question discussed in Butler's three Sermons at the Rolls Court; 2. The question whether the words *good* and *just*, will indicate degrees of meritorious superiority, or only imply the fulfilment of a law; 3. The modern Heresy respecting the doctrine of our Second and Fifteenth Articles. All these in their *intellectual* aspects, (and how much in this point does the intellectual aspect of a doctrine affect its practical aspect!) are connected with this (extinct!) dispute.

already given and known, which it is the end of science to find. But meantime what were the Nominalists doing? That they resisted this monstrous assumption, and thereby won a claim to our warmest gratitude, we own; but they went further, implicitly and often directly,—so directly, that this has now become the avowed *disbelief* of a large body of philosophers;—they denied, not that the name *is* the kind, but that there are any kinds; kind is a dream—a mere abstraction! Now here we say is, first, an outrage on reason; secondly, a system of utter confusion; thirdly, just as much as the other creed was, a death blow to discovery. That it hath been the glory of God to conceal this thing, and only to give the hint of it in names, we acknowledge; but that it is for the son of creation, the humble searcher into God's ways, to search it out, we affirm also; and if man thinks there is nothing to find, we are certain he will not seek.

But now, what was the common root of these two errors, which we see had a common effect? I answer, both stood upon a mere logical ground; both were merely dealing with definitions and abstractions. When we are assigning the conditions of discourse, it is most true that the *genus* is nothing but the last abstraction expressing the *sine quâ non;* the *caput mortuum* of all the individuals of a class. But the *kind*, which the philosopher seeks after, is to be seen and studied in the most perfect individual of the class; that one who unites all the true properties of each of the individuals in that class, without a single anomaly; that individual of the class who is the connecting point between it and some higher order. It is evident, I conceive, that the guardian conditions of Logic,

those, which shall keep it from leaping over its fence and desolating the whole field of knowledge, must be drawn from some science, which is not occupied with names but with realities; some science, which exhibits and satisfies that idea, wherewith, as you see, Logic has no connexion, for this very reason, that it is a sound substantial idea and no abstraction. Perhaps for a moment you would be inclined to say, "These conditions then should be physical; Bacon will do more than any one else can to avert this danger." But mark! no physical study is in a perfect state. Possibly its perfection will consist in the discovery of the individual which most exactly and perfectly exhibits each kind, and of the relation and subordination which exists between different kinds. A careful reflection upon the direction which physical study, when most prosperous, has taken might favour such an opinion. But even then, would there be any thing to satisfy the feelings and longings of men? See how those longings have discovered themselves in men's words and acts. Surely in the hope and belief that some one of their own race, some perfect man, will appear, who should shew forth what Humanity is, himself the while,—as the condition of his manifesting,—transcending it. Tell me what all Greek mythology is aiming at, if not at this. Tell me what men in all ages have been crying and groaning for, if not for this, and for that more awful manifestation, which they felt must be connected and mysteriously involved in this, the manifestation of—GOD.

See then why that happened, which you have often thought of with wonder, which you cannot think of with too much horror, that when the book of God's revelation was shut up, when faith of a direct access

to him through one Mediator was lost, when the idea of a righteous King of men was banished by the intolerable fiction of a visible mortal substitute, Logic leaped into the throne of Theology, and with dry skeleton hands swayed her awful sceptre. Oh! do you wonder at the rage with which first Wickliffe at Oxford, and then Luther at Wittenberg, beheld the ghastly abstraction, or at the divine energy with which they were inspired to hurl it down? Have you the heart to condemn them, if sometimes they treated the whole science as if it were rubbish, and upbraided in no mild language its innocent discoverer? Yet do you not admire more the calm wisdom of our Reformers, which compelled the polluted study into their service, and forced it to do yeoman's duty against those, who had at once deified and degraded it? This did they, when they framed our Theological Articles. This was the fortress which they reared against the incursions of Logic; this was the splendid example they gave of its manly and practical use.

And I adjure those who have the rule in our University now, not to believe that what was needed for our protection in the sixteenth century, has become less necessary in the nineteenth. Where is this strange notion bred, that we are creatures of an altogether different race and order from our forefathers; that we are not subjected to the same infirmities; liable to the self-same blunders, superstitions, corruptions? Methinks such an opinion indicates a most heartless want of sympathy with the past; which, being one of the worst symptoms of national degeneracy, would of itself shew that no former disease can be unlikely to befal us, no former precautions can be unnecessary. And surely he who knows his own

heart, and to what temptations he is liable, which, he may guess with tolerable confidence, are not very different from those which beset the age, will find this one, of being apt to substitute what is abstract for what is real, none of the least. For if we observe ourselves, and read History, we shall find that such a disposition is not incompatible with our extreme devotion to visible and sensible objects, but has always accompanied it. And do we see nothing in our Theology at this day to make us tremble, lest the same should come upon us which came upon our ancestors in the middle ages? There is less of Logic, indeed, less of anxious and earnest thought, but is there less of notionality, or more of life, than there was in the days of Duns Scotus and Aquinas? I hope there is; but it is a question, which, I think, only some very sanguine and benevolent Christian, or some magazine parasite of the age, could answer at once and decidedly in the affirmative. But if you see nothing in the aspect of the English religious world to excite your apprehensions, can you contemplate the new form of Gnosticism which is rising up in France under the ominous name of Ontology, and which has for its propounder and elucidator perhaps the ablest man in that country, and not perceive in what direction the mind of this age is tending? I believe a good man, who meditates upon such a result as, I believe, has arisen in the world, and will again arise, wherever the notion of an intellectual entity takes the place of faith in a living God, will be filled with more horror and amazement than if he had a vision of Temples rising all around him to Jupiter, Vishnu, or Moloch. "Life dies, death lives," is the only description applicable to the chaos, which a

nation becomes, when it is permitted in the righteous judgment of God to endure such a catastrophe. Wherefore, if we have any remnant of patriotism, any fear of God or love to man, let us not do any act, of which it may be said hereafter, 'This was one of those measures, which brought this dreadful woe upon us[d].'

The last subject of Logic has prepared the way for the few remarks which I have to make on the study of Physics. Bacon overturned the tyranny of Logic over physical science, we grant. But Bacon found Logic already deposed from its dominion over the studies of Humanity. That work had been accomplished by Luther and by our Reformers. And let any one compare the Novum Organon with the writings of Luther, and say whether he does not feel that the ideas of the one have so impregnated the mind of the other, that all his own discoveries are but the result of their working. In fact, this is no opinion of mine. Nearly all men seem by their language to hold it. We speak almost in common discourse of Hervey and Bacon, as kinsmen of Luther. I am only repeating what thousands, both plain men and philosophers, have said before me, when I affirm, that it was not possible for the veil to be taken from physical science, till it had first been withdrawn from moral science. And that for a very obvious reason, because the great act of superstition is to confound matter and spirit, the invisible and visible, and to confer upon the one the awe and glory which belongs to the other. How then can the true properties of any thing in nature be discovered, while it is invested with all these false properties, and all this imaginary sacredness? The

[d] See note at the end.

fact for which I contend, whatever the reason of it may be, was recognized some years ago in the Edinburgh Review, in an Article on Professor Stewart's History of Philosophy, which was attributed to Sir James Mackintosh. The relation between Luther and Bacon is there admitted and almost assumed; the same accomplished writer tracing also a connexion, which we are as little anxious to deny, between the notions of Locke and those of the Puritans among whom he was educated[e].

But common opinion and this unsuspected authority, seeing that they refer only to one chapter, though a vast chapter, in Philosophical History, cannot weigh so much as the testimony of Bacon himself, who surveyed the whole volume. And any testimony of his in our favour would certainly be an unprejudiced one; for no one is more willing, at times, to cast a slur upon moral philosophy; as when, for instance, in the preface to the Instauratio Magna, he maintains that Eve was tempted to transgress through desiring moral knowledge, instead of the pure unsophisticated knowledge of nature. Yet can you read either the Novum Organon itself, or still more the Advancement of Learning, without perceiving that false notions of Theology and Humanity, the pursuit of studies loosely and irregularly, without reference to an object, the piling them one upon another, to use his own simile,

[e] But this remark applies only to the Essay on the Human Understanding, with its practical commentaries, the Essay on Education and the Hints on the Conduct of the Understanding. As to the Essay on Government, Mr. Coleridge's assertion has never been denied, that he gained whatever in it his followers have not been compelled to abandon as untenable, not from the Puritans, but from Hooker.

like the Giants' hills, in hopes of climbing to Heaven by them, have been in all ages the great hindrances to physical science?

There is, however, one fact, which in appearance is very strongly against me. I mean, as my readers will easily imagine, the state of the Moors under the Abbassides. Let us consider this point, and if it also turns out in my favour, I shall consider my case sufficiently proved. The following striking passage from Gibbon will set the argument against me in a strong light. "But the Moslems deprived themselves of the principal benefits of a familiar intercourse with Greece and Rome, the knowledge of antiquity, the purity of taste, and the freedom of thought. Confident in the riches of their native tongue, the Arabians disdained the study of any foreign idiom. The Greek interpreters were chosen among their Christian subjects; they formed their translations sometimes on the original text, more frequently, perhaps, on a Syriac version, and *in the crowd of astronomers and physicians, there is no example of a poet, an orator, or even an historian* being taught to speak the language of the Saracens. The mythology of Homer would have provoked the abhorrence of those stern fanatics; they possessed in lazy ignorance the colonies of the Macedonians, and the provinces of Carthage and Rome; the heroes of Plutarch and Livy were buried in oblivion; and the history of the world before Mahomet was reduced to a short legend of the patriarchs, the prophets, and the Persian kings. Our education in the Greek and Latin schools may have fixed in our minds a standard of exclusive taste, and I am not forward to condemn the literature and judgment of nations, of whose language I am ignorant. Yet I *know* that the

classes have much to teach, and I *believe* that the orientals have much to learn, the temperate dignity of style, the graceful proportions of art, the forms of visible and intellectual beauty, the just delineation of character and passion, the rhetoric of narrative and argument, the regular fabric of epic and dramatic poetry. The influence of truth and reason is of a less ambiguous complexion. The philosophers of Athens and Rome enjoyed the blessings, and asserted the rights, of civil and religious freedom. Their moral and political writings might have gradually unlocked the fetters of Eastern despotism, diffused a liberal spirit of enquiry and toleration, and encouraged the Arabian sages to suspect that their caliph was a tyrant, and their prophet an impostor." Chap. 52. In this passage it seems to be asserted, that, in the dearth of all the studies of Humanity, the Moors nevertheless obtained no ordinary proficiency in Physics. I do not wish to get rid of a single syllable of the historian's fair and honest statement; for see how it really affects the question: these Moors had, it is confessed, a great knowledge in Algebra, considerable acquaintance with the ancient Geometry; they had, moreover, various instruments of observation, and the "land of the Chaldeans still afforded the same spacious level, the same unclouded horizon," as in ancient days. But, with all these helps and appliances, what progress did the Arabians make in the path of true science? None whatever. There were dreams in the long night of physical ignorance in papal Europe; the Copernian idea of the universe half dawned on some of the philosophers in the middle ages, as on some of their pagan predecessors. It *was* one speculation among a thousand. But to the sense-bound spirit of the Moor,

it never presented itself even as a vague speculation, a distant possibility. Hear Gibbon again: "From the reign of the Abbassides, to that of the grandchildren of Tamerlane, the stars, without the aid of *glasses*, were diligently observed, and the astronomical tables of Bagdad, Spain, and Sarmarcand, correct some minute errors, *without daring to renounce the hypothesis of Ptolemy, without advancing a step towards the discovery of the solar system.*" Can there be a more striking *experimentum crucis* of the question, a more decisive demonstration, that physical science cannot long survive the destruction or perversion of human studies?

Hitherto I have been occupied with setting out my principle; but there are a few current and popular notions unfavourable to my views, which, I know, will still retain an influence over the minds even of those who have assented to my general argument. It is fitting, therefore, that I should establish the correctness of that principle, by shewing that these objections derive their force, from the ignorance or forgetfulness of it. The first that I shall notice is the complaint, that conditions of thought are not in fact a security for manly study; that the body which possesses them is in this merit far below other bodies, as, for instance, the University of Cambridge, and the Universities in Germany, which dispense with them.

It cannot have escaped any reader, that, while I have spoken of conditions of thought as a preservative against certain evils, to which students are exposed, I have yet spoken of these evils as actually existing in the University of Oxford. This is a parodox and in-

consistency, no doubt, and it is one which I am bound to justify. I can justify it, alas! too satisfactorily. I have said that conditions of thought are intended to be used as guides in our studies. From what I know of Oxford, I fear they are but rarely so used. I have said that these conditions of thought are intended to mark out the end for which our studies are to be pursued; the attainment of truth, and the cultivation of a large and catholic Humanity. I fear that the majority are not keeping this end in sight. In saying so, I feel myself much more a criminal than a judge; but when the question is, whether precious institutions, or our own reputation in this age, should be sacrificed, I cannot hesitate: I cannot doubt that the cowardly liberal compliment, 'We do not blame you, we blame the system,' should be indignantly repelled by each one of us, with an *Adsum qui feci.*

Why we neglect to *use* Articles for which we are ready enough to *fight*, is a deeply interesting question, to which I do not feel myself competent to give a complete answer. Speaking from what I have seen and experienced, I should be inclined to mention two reasons as the most weighty. The first is the habit of proposing University honours to ourselves as the great benefit of study. I do not concern myself with the question, whether it is right or wrong to propose these rewards. They are certainly no part of our ancient University system, nor, I confess, do I see any means of reconciling them with the principle of it. But further than this, I do not venture to speak.

It may have been necessary to make these innovations from circumstances with which I am not acquainted; the "pressure from without" is said to have been strong at the time they were adopted, and

the motives for yielding to it, and introducing a worldly leaven into University legislation and morality, may have been very cogent; I would only speak of what I have observed as to the effect on those who have entered into the spirit of the present system, and still more on those, a majority I believe among really diligent students, who cannot quite yield to it, or to the principles of a former age. Restlessness; want of any feeling of connexion in their studies; a habit of 'getting up' book after book for an examination, with a very faint apprehension of any other purpose for reading them; a growing incapacity for perceiving any objects in life but such as are visible and tangible; these habits of mind, most happily counteracted, and sometimes wholly overcome by sound principles early ingrafted and kept alive by those very institutions which they felt to be most irksome, have served to sow the fruits of this seeking of gifts and following after rewards. And hence there has arisen, I think, a darkness respecting Articles, and their use; because those who are never launching into an open sea of discovery, but always coasting in creeks and shallows, do not feel that they need charts or compasses, but rather are disposed to throw them overboard.

The other course which I have noticed is a feeling among Oxford young men, that mere scholastic education has something in it which disqualifies for the service of the world: by which notion some are tempted to adopt affectations of the nineteenth century, and to neglect their studies; others, to set up for idolaters of a former period, and to affect contempt for every thing which is modern. This notion I have therefore been particularly anxious to fight against in this pamphlet, by shewing that one who is really trained

according to the old discipline of the University, will be far better fitted than any of those, whom the age is bringing up in its own training schools and gymnasia, to cope with all the particular questions by which men at this day are vexed, and to cast light upon them. For surely to be carried backwards and forwards by all the eddies of public opinion, is not the best way of coming to understand what that opinion is, and of learning to govern it. This knowledge is to be gotten in silence and quietness of mind, such as that which was cultivated by the old prophets whom God taught in solitude to apprehend the conditions of their countrymen, and to be the wisest and noblest politicians that the world has ever seen.

But it is further urged, we not only do not see truth followed with a single eye at Oxford, where Theological Articles are put forth; but we do find that she is sought after earnestly in places where they are not put forth—in Cambridge, for instance, and the German Universities.

Now as to Cambridge, I fully admit in the first place that it has *as a body* recognised the principle against which I have been contending in this pamphlet, and actually substituted a Declaration of conformity for a Subscription to Articles. If this point be considered, it will be seen that it does not make against my case at all, but for it. The main intention of Cambridge thought has been towards Mathematical and Physical Studies. Should we not therefore have expected that the University would do just what we see it has done, viz. misunderstand the nature of those Articles, and not perceive that they are conditions of thought, seeing that for the studies uppermost in Cambridge minds they are *not* conditions of thought?

It took the Articles to be what they clearly are not, because, for an obvious reason, it could not perceive what they are.

But, secondly, it is not true that Cambridge (if by Cambridge is meant the *lecturers*) is without Articles. All teachers must have subscribed to them. And if the other lectures at Trinity resemble those of Mr. Evans, even in the shape of direct theological instruction, the Articles are as much imposed in this, not perhaps the most theological College in Cambridge, as in Oxford. So far then, the only difference between the two Universities would seem to be, that in Cambridge, the conditions of thought are not stated to the students at their entrance. In this point of view I have already shewn, I think, that the Oxford course is at once more straight forward, more respectful to the student, and more favourable to the interests of science.

But, thirdly, I am not inclined to deny, that while the exclusive *nonconformist* notion of Articles, which I have been exposing in this pamphlet, prevails to so great an extent, as it evidently does prevail, even in high quarters, there will be great *accidental* advantages accruing to an University, which, acting in general on the principles of the Articles, does not impose them. I am not disposed to deny that there has been a freedom, and energy, and manliness of thought at Cambridge, a courageous grappling with difficulties, and a zealous pursuit after truth, which Oxford may reasonably envy[f]. I have never attempted to deny

[f] It is quite consistent with what I have already maintained about Oxford, if I add, that I believe that Cambridge has produced *more* men of refined scholarship and refined Humanity, because *all* the honours of the University have, till of quite late years, taken another direction.

that the notion of imposing Articles as terms of communion, while it destroys all true idea of spiritual fellowship, and reduces that body which has ever been the great witness for an universal Church to the level of a sect, and injures personal devotion, does at the same time enfeeble and degrade the intellect. But then I contend, that this circumstance is merely accidental; that it has nothing whatever to do with the real principle of imposition, and has been the product of that sectarian spirit, which is destroying the vitals of every ecclesiastical institution; and therefore, fourthly, I can, in perfect consistency with this admission of the superiority, which, in certain important qualities of the heart and intellect, Cambridge has held over Oxford, contend that Cambridge would be very much the better, if her sons were subjected to the same severe and manly conditions of thought, to which every student at Oxford consents. I cannot speak with indifference, far less with reproach, of a University which I have every reason to revere and love; but I would appeal to the consciences of some who are best able to pronounce a verdict on the subject, and are least liable to be warped by prejudice in giving it. The most earnest and truth seeking men I have ever known, or I believe could be found any where, have grown up in that University; men, I believe, as incapable of being separated from that Mistress by worldly considerations, or fear of man, as any of those who have suffered and bled for her sake. Now I would ask them, whether, in looking back upon their University career, and the years which succeeded it, they do not call to mind periods of strife and waywardness, of dark despondency and unsettled hope; whether they are not conscious to themselves of hav-

ing had, not for a while only, but for years together, aimless thoughts and vague purposes, which made them often inclined to curse, instead of to bless, that place of their early training, which, now that they can look calmly back upon it, and estimate its total effect upon their character, has part, I am well persuaded, in their strongest affections, and provokes some of their most solemn thanksgivings. I would ask such persons, whether there was not a conscious want in their minds of some directing authority, not to supersede indeed (for what words or letters can supersede?) the living voice of experienced friends, or the more awful teachings of the voice within, but yet stamped with a reverend majesty, of which the thousand vulgarities of daily life partly deprive the former, and which passion and restlessness hinder us from recognizing in the other.

Supposing there could have been such a guide through the mazes of past speculations, such a connecting link between those speculations and what was passing in their own hearts, such a friendly guide and monitor, in the shape of an ancient document, drawn up by considerate and holy men; I ask them, would this have been a bondage? would it have shackled the freedom and energy of their spirits? would it have hindered one aspiration after the beautiful and the good? would it not rather have delivered them from what, even then, they felt were restraints to that freedom, were checks upon those aspirations? would it not have shewn them their way through many mists, which hid from them the palace to which their steps were bound, and have preserved them from pressing many a will o' the wisp, which drew them wholly out of the road to it? That such

a document should be contained in those Thirty-nine Articles, which were associated in their minds with large wigs, afternoon slumbers, and a hatred of all youthful eagerness and hope, would indeed have seemed to them most extraordinary; but if they remember that at the same time newspapers and magazines, the periodical literature of the day, appeared to them in the light of friends and deliverers, though they now know that to have any respect or devotion for these, is only another name for being in the most ignominious vassalage to the vulgar notions and superstitions of the age; they may perchance think with themselves, that as their predilections were hastily and ignorantly adopted, so also may have been their aversions. And if this preparatory indisposition of mind be removed, which, while it lasts, will of course hinder them from judging any question fairly, I have little doubt that in their present state of mind, hoping more earnestly and confidently than ever that they themselves and their brethren will be guided into all truth, but chastened and humbled by the discovery that they never will obtain it unless they are guided by an Almighty hand, and finding that all means and schemes and appliances are not scorned by that Wise Teacher, but are pressed into His service, they will discover, that these Articles do fulfil, better than any production of the same kind which past ages have bequeathed to us, that office of a safety lamp, of which, even in their more inexperienced years, when they first descended into the mines of human thought, they felt that they had need.

But I must turn to the German Universities, on which I will be very brief, having anticipated some of my observations in speaking of Cambridge. Throughout it has been my endeavour to shew, that freedom

of the spirit, which is the thing most necessary to man,—the free exercise of the reason, and, subordinately to it, of every faculty and affection which has been given to man,—is another thing altogether from that which is so often mistaken for it, freedom of speculation. I do not mean that the latter, so far as it implies the absence of legislative fetters, is not closely connected with the former; but I mean, that when a man indulges his intellect to all the freaks to which it is inclined, he is not in the way to be a freeman, but he is in the way to become a slave. I do not confine my remark to the imagination. I know that it wants restraints and laws, and many severe restraints and laws, in order to its manly exercise; but so also does the hard, dry intellect, nor will it ever do the work for which it was given, and for which we need it, unless it has learnt to endure government. Now I contend that the intellect of the Germans is not one whit too vigorous, not one whit too actively exercised; but I contend that it is not exercised under those conditions, which enable it to move with true and manly freedom, and in harmony with all the other faculties. I am very anxious to make this remark, because it is sometimes said, both by the friends and the enemies of the German nation, that they pursue knowledge for knowledge sake, that this is their virtue or their infirmity. Now I cannot perceive, that pursuing knowledge for knowledge sake, if by knowledge is meant *truth*, the object of knowledge, can ever be a charge against any one. But what I complain of in the Germans is, that the pleasure of the art of knowing, in them, entirely supersedes the consideration of the object. It is with them so mightily pleasant a thing to be always

asking Pilate's question, "What is truth?" that I confess I am unable to perceive that they care particularly for a reply, or are thoroughly persuaded that one is possible. No one can accuse them of wanting zeal, nor a certain degree of moral fairness; they are disposed to look at evidence on a great many sides, perhaps on every side, but they forget that evidence is to prove something; they forget that things are before they are known, and that in the spiritual just as little as in the material world does the knowledge constitute the reality, though by the knowledge we are made partakers of it. A sense that something has been done, something has been proved in the world, before he came into it; a feeling that he is walking under a firmament of truths, which actually are, though they will be nothing to him unless he enters into personal and real acquaintance with them; this, it seems to me, would be most salutary, most cheering, most invigorating, to a young German student. It would not quench his ardour for truth, it would only give it manliness and direction; it would take away his self-conceit and not his courage; it would give him a sense of reality, of which he is now destitute. Of course I do not take upon myself to pronounce that Berlin and Göttingen ought to adopt our Thirty-nine Articles into their course of instruction; national character and circumstances require different treatment, and some of the Articles have clearly a national character, which would make them ridiculous any where else; nor do I know that, except the faith of the Germans were first called out by creeds and forms of worship, propository Articles of any kind, even struck, as they doubtless ought at all events to be, in a native and not a foreign mint,

would not rather confirm than check some of their evil tendencies. But I leave the circumstances of Germany to her own patriots, of whom, I trust, she has yet many. All I am anxious for is, that we should not suffer our own national institutions, in the right understanding and right use of which I see the best hopes of England, the best hopes of our future growth and progress, to be sacrificed to our imitation of the Germans. And such an evil may be feared from two causes. First, from the natural admiration, in earnest and affectionate minds, of what seems so congenial in German thought and literature; and, secondly, from the inadequacy of our popular philosophy and, it may be feared, of our popular theology to meet the powers which they are bringing into play.

I pass on to another objection which is constantly brought against the use of Articles, and which persons of most opposite religious opinions combine to urge. Their watchword is the celebrated phrase of Chillingworth, "The Bible, and the Bible only, is the religion of Protestants:" the great *argumentum ad hominem* in its defence, our own eighth Article. If the Scripture contain all things necessary to salvation, whence the need of Articles? The direct question contained in these words I have already replied to more than once. Articles, as such, contain nothing necessary to salvation. But I am not ignorant that the feeling, ill-defined and not able to express itself in words, yet floats about men's minds—Articles do in some sort interfere with the reverence which we owe to the Scriptures. I believe it is in the main an honest feeling, and that it ought to be fairly encountered. I would in the first place remark, that the objection is applied equally to two kinds of compositions, which I

have shewn to be essentially distinct in their nature: to Creeds, that is, the professions of personal faith in God; and to Articles, which are merely intellectual propositions. With the first I have, properly speaking, nothing to do on the present occasion, but yet as the notions are confused in the minds of the objectors, I will not refuse an answer to either. With respect to Creeds, then, the objection is founded upon this strange notion, that it is not the things revealed, which are the objects of our faith, and the bonds of our fellowship, but that it is the revelation, or rather the mere book recording or containing the revelation. Now a notion more dangerous than this,—one tending more deeply to pharisaical idolatry and superstition, and that slavish reverence for letter and words, with which our Lord, when on earth, and His Apostles sustained a more difficult conflict, than with almost any other evil tendency of the human heart,—a notion leading more straight from superstition to indifference, from indifference to atheism,—was never concocted or devised. Either the Bible reveals something, or nothing; if it reveals something, it is that something which we want to know, it is that something which it signifies to us to know. Is that something expressible? can one man set it before another? How should he set it before another? In music? In painting? By some undiscovered method of communication between eye and eye? But if in words, those words form a Creed, twist yourself as you please to escape from a name; it is the name and the only name that can be given to those words. What the nature of the creed should be, is, I confess, a most important question. Here I go all lengths with the objector in contending for plainness and simplicity; but the

terms plainness and simplicity must be understood. In one sense the system of Ptolemy is vastly more plain than the system of Newton. It commends itself directly to the senses, but the misfortune is, it does not explain the phenomena; it is exceedingly likely and uncommonly sensible, but it tells us nothing. I want a revelation to tell me who God is, how He is made known to me, by what means I may have fellowship with Him. If the Bible tells me this, the Bible tells me what I want to know; if it stops short of this, it is not the revelation I look for; if it tells me this, I can set down what it tells me; the simplest form in which I set it down is the best, provided I do actually set down what has been revealed. That our Creed, the Creed which has been in use in the Church for seventeen or eighteen centuries, does fulfil these conditions, we are prepared to shew, and so long as it fulfils them, we shall contend for its use in the Church, as a homage to the Bible, not an offence to it; and to drive it from the Church on any such ground, would be to say, the Bible is indeed a stupendous book, a most perfect revelation, the only authority, but it imparts no knowledge, it does not contain a single truth which is apprehensible by man.

But propository Articles, it is said, interfere with the Scripture of truth, if personal Creeds do not. What is the suppressed premiss here? What is the real reason why propository Articles are supposed to interfere with the Bible? Because the Bible itself is supposed to be a set of propository Articles. This great fiction, this monstrous insult to the Divine word, has gained ground most extensively in the Protestant Church, and was never more in fashion

than in the present day. A more striking defence of Articles than this cannot be produced; those who will not submit their minds to the conditions of thought which grave men, practised in their own hearts and in the history of the world, have composed for their assistance, in order to deliver them out of the notions and superstitions that are natural to their own mind, and which are growing up all around them, these men so find the *want* of such Articles, such conditions of thought, that they turn the book of God, which was written for no such purpose, into a set of formal propositions. And thus it comes to pass, that all the mighty schemes of Providence,—all the development of a nation's life through different stages of its history,—all the actual growth of the nation out of the family, of the church out of the nation,—all the living, practical records, by which man is made known to himself, to his brother man, and by which God is made known to him,—all the plan of education which God hath pursued to bring man to a knowledge of Himself, and which is set down with such marvellous order and accuracy in that book,—all this is forgotten, and thrown overboard by those, who nevertheless claim for *the Bible* the worship which *it* claims for God. Under pretence of magnifying the words of Scripture, they destroy the very letter of the book; they will not take plain words to mean words, and acts to mean acts. Every thing is to be sacrificed in order that the book may be converted into a framework of notions and propositions.

And here I may add, that I conceive no mistake lays so open to the assaults of Neologism and Rationalism, as that which I am now attacking. The notion

that the Bible is a collection of articles of faith, or logical propositions, and that the way of determining religious controversies is by balancing sentence against sentence, under pretence of doing homage to the word of God, and the notion which is built upon this, that the Bible is therefore to supersede all propository Articles and conditions of thought, is that which gives Neologism its great popularity. For it is impossible that any set of men who will speak of Moses, as if he were a legislator; of David, as if he were a king; of Paul, as if he were really a man of flesh and blood; and facts, as if they were facts; it is impossible, I say, that any such man, be his theories what they may, shall not gain ground in the common sense and feelings of mankind, against those who deal with the Bible, as if between it and all the other books in the world, there existed no link or connection whatsoever; as if its *doings* were all mysterious and imaginary, and its *words* alone possessed a magical virtue. The common sense and honesty, and, I will add, the religion of men's minds, revolt against such a system, with whatever pretences of reverence for an inspired writing, and denunciations against those who may venture to question its wisdom, it may be guarded. Men who are in earnest must have reality at any price; they will sacrifice even reverence to obtain it: there is an air of reality about the Neological writers; and if persons are not made acquainted with the necessities of their own minds, that air of reality will pass for reality itself.

For the sake of the honour of the Bible then; most especially that it may be preserved in its true and real character as the record of the ways of

God to man;—that it may become to us, what it has never yet sufficiently been made, not only the interpreter of our own thoughts, and the acting of our individual minds, but the interpreter of the workings of society, the key to unlock the treasures which are hid in the literature of all nations and languages;—that we may not defeat the purposes for which God has given the precious gift to the world, under pretext of doing it honour;—let not Articles be abolished from a fancy that the Bible supplies their place, but let them remain as strong and hardy conditions of thought, to discipline men's minds to the worthy and humble exposition of it, enabling us to dispel the mists which the proud, darkened, sense-bound spirit of man is always raising about these seven-times purified words of wisdom and truth.

Another objection takes the following form: 'Your University,' it is said, 'is composed of two classes, one intended for the Church and the other for different professions. With respect to the first, these Articles are far too elaborate and learned. Clergymen, if they are good for any thing, ought to be preachers to the multitude; they are to set before them simple truths revealed to simple understandings. It is very mischievous that such persons should be taught to look upon theology as so complicated and refined; it is the cause of the great indifference of the people to the clergy, the great cause of their frequenting Methodist chapels; the abolition of the Articles will do a great deal towards giving us simple preachers. And as to the other professions, these Articles have nothing whatever to do with them. If you have proved that they have something to do with logic and rhetoric, you have only found that lawyers and physi-

cians do not want logic and rhetoric; and yet, besides requiring a Subscription to Articles at entering the University, you require one at leaving it; as if these conditions of thought had something to do with the plain business of life to which they are then about to devote themselves.'

I shall take these objections in order. First, as to preaching. We want a simple ministry, a set of men who will set truths in a simple form before the people. Granted. It is what the country wants, what it most earnestly desires; it is that commodity with which she expects the Universities to furnish her. I will go further; I will confess that we have not such a supply of this commodity as we want, that there is in a great portion of English preachers (of course there are some glorious exceptions) a want of that power by which Luther and the Reformers in Germany, and Latimer and the Reformers in England, commended their words to the minds of a people, certainly not better instructed than the agricultural and manufacturing population of England at the present day; but the question is, whence comes the evil? how may it be remedied? It comes, say the objectors, from the notion that Theology is so complicated and intricate a study, a notion which the Thirty-nine Articles mightily help to confirm. Now in what sense do the Articles lead us to suppose that Theology is an intricate study? That they lead us to consider the knowledge of God the highest and deepest knowledge which men can enjoy, the sum of all knowledge, that in which alone knowledge finds its full and satisfactory meaning, this is true; that they teach us that by nature the heart and mind of man are averse from this knowledge, this also is true; but with all this they

teach us, and that in the plainest language, that this knowledge is attainable by the poorest man in the land, and that it is his right and inheritance. In what sense then do they still declare Theology an intricate study? They declare that a thousand and ten thousand superstitions and darknesses have started up in the natural understanding, to becloud the truth and hinder its manifestation to men; they make us feel that these errors which have come up under different forms, in each age, have so certainly their roots in the evil nature of man, that they are sent to reproduce themselves, and can by no human possibility become extinct. Now here are two ways in which they represent Theology as difficult. It is difficult to attain the knowledge of God and to serve Him, because the world, and the flesh, and the devil are against it. There is a moral and spiritual difficulty common to all men, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, in no wise greater to one than to another. And again, it is difficult to know all the paths and windings of error in the human heart, how they run into each other, how they have affected men in all ages; this is an intellectual, as well as a moral and spiritual difficulty. To learn this, is the part of the minister or teacher; for this, he becomes a student in Theology; whilst pursuing this, if he does not mistake his vocation, he finds that numerous other studies become a part of Theology. The question then at issue is this, Are the Articles right or wrong, in affirming the existence of multitudinous errors and superstitions? Are they right or wrong in affirming that these errors and superstitions, when they have gained ground in a land, have made the knowledge of God impossible, and thereby have destroyed all morality, all national

and political righteousness? Are they wrong in affirming that these superstitions have reproduced themselves in the human heart, and ever will reproduce themselves? If they are not, then is ministerial simplicity destroyed by these superstitions, or by the knowledge that they exist? Are the people hindered from finding truth by their tendency to these superstitions, or by having a minister who knows whence they will arise or how to check them? This is the reason of the case. Now let us look at the facts. I spoke of the Reformers making their way to the hearts of men, and having been enabled to present truth to them, with a life and power which we do not discern in modern preaching. Were these Reformers trained in a less severe intellectual discipline than we are? or was their discipline tenfold more stern, more scholastic than ours? The objector supposes that scholastic discipline inevitably leads to scholastic preaching; a greater mistake cannot be imagined. It is perfectly true that the preaching of the seventeenth century was insufferably, intolerably scholastic, not because the preachers were more severely educated than in the former age, for I think it may be easily shewn, that their logic, though more obtrusive, was far less subtle than that of their predecessors, but because in that age devotional forms were disregarded, Creeds and Liturgies were esteemed a bondage, and therefore Articles became all in all, the meat, drink, and clothing of the soul[a].

[a] But there were in that age simple preachers. A beautiful story is told of that profound and erudite scholar, Pococke. A deputation from the parliamentary commissioners, appointed to report against malignants and sequester livings, came into his parish. Meeting

But there are other ways, in which it is possible to deviate from simplicity, besides that of being scholastic. Abstract phraseology, whatever persons may think, is at least as unintelligible to the common people as learned phraseology. In abstract phraseology I include every word that has not a sensible exponent; all those words with which one finds every Scotch treatise and nearly every Scotch sermon abound; all those words which one does not find in Homer, Shakespeare, or the authorized translation of the Bible.

Now if a person like William Cobbett is conversant with nothing but outward and sensible matter, such a man, having a masculine understanding, and the good sense never to depart from the language of the class in which he has been bred, will undoubtedly express himself in a clear manly Saxon style. And so also

with an honest rustic, one of his flock, they endeavoured, by various leading questions, to discover some grounds of impeachment against the episcopal clergymen, if not for offences in life, at least for error in doctrine, or at any rate for substituting profane learning for Christianity. The answer was most distressing. 'No,' said the countryman, 'I dare say our parson would'nt do for the great folk, *he arnt much of a Latiner*, but he tells us about Jesus Christ, and the things we simple people like to hear of.' I can supply a modern pendant to this story. A certain worthy maker of rush chair bottoms was employed by some well-disposed persons to preach to some villagers in the south of England. There was danger, to be sure, that his statements might be occasionally confused; and some little, that his own piety might suffer from such a display; but then it was all important, that the people should have a simple gospel, and a simple gospel such a simple man was sure to preach. A person who had patronized him, going to hear one of his sermons, addressed to a set of south country boors, was somewhat astonished to hear the mender of chair bottoms discoursing respecting *Socrates* and *Plato!*

the poor husbandman, who does concern himself with spiritual things, brings forth out of the treasure which his keen observant eye has accumulated, things new and old, which will be cast into an English *mint* and will come out sterling coin. But if a person becomes in any way conversant with technical phrases of Christianity—if he gets any sort of intellectual acquaintance with it—I apprehend he must carry that intellectual acquaintance a good way, he must subject his mind to severe discipline, if he would escape the temptation of abstract language, and adopt that which is alone within the reach of common understandings, I had nearly said, the only language which conveys an actual bonâ fide meaning to any understandings. Accordingly we find, I believe, this abstract language no where more rich and flourishing than in the sermons of popular dissenting ministers. Of course precisely the same observation will apply, for precisely the same reason, to those Clergymen who have not thought it worth their while to cultivate their understandings, thinking that a pious disposition, with a little knack at composition, is sufficient for a preacher of the word. Such persons, I must maintain, be they called what they will, are not simple preachers; they may never deviate from a certain track, which has been marked out for them; they may never go out of the road of their own experience, or a few favourite books; and thus they may easily persuade themselves that they are simple, and make it a point of habitual complaint against others that they are not so: but the question is, how much of what they actually say is apprehended; how much passes alive into the minds of those who hear them; how much which appears pleasantly and softly to trickle in, soon becomes

hardened into an ice of habitual doctrinalism, which the awakened spirit on a death bed would give all the world that it could break through.

One of the first things which our conditions of thought rightly perused admonish a student is of the perils of phraseology; there is enough in every page of ecclesiastical history, unfolded and interpreted to him by the accurate compilers of these Articles, to make him tremble every time he takes an abstract word into his lips, lest he should be substituting a sound, or a mere logical conception, for the realities of the Gospel. Such a man will be compelled to try his own use even of the most regular watchword and symbols of religious writings, by a severe test. This peril to simplicity then—the use of abstract language—is, I think, more likely to be escaped by him who has been brought up under the discipline, than by him who has not.

I have alluded to abstract phraseology; another foe, I apprehend, to simplicity in modern preaching is commercial and forensic phraseology, and a commercial habit of thinking. Let any one compare our sermons with those of the age of the Reformers. In that period, as well as in the primitive ages of Christianity, men looked upon the relationships of father, brother, husband, king, as steps of a ladder which connect earth with heaven; their relationships were considered the direct means of leading men upwards into spiritual truth, and language drawn from them, the grandest and the safest that could be adopted for communicating the knowledge of God to man. Illustrations and metaphors taken from the material transactions of society, were not declined; they, as well as all nature and all art, were laid under

contribution, and brought not unwillingly into the service of the sanctuary; but they were the border and the tracery, not the groundwork. Such, it seems to me, was the form of theological thought and theological instruction at the time our Articles were composed. Commerce was at that time in its infancy; now, it appears to have brought every thing within its enchanted circle, and nothing seems to have done it more homage than our sermons and our theology. Jeremy Taylor, in his Sermon on the Marriage Ring, thought it necessary to remind those to whom he preached, that the words 'marriage,' and 'union,' as applied to the mystical relation between the invisible Head of the body and its members, were *not* terms of art. That great man perceived that these ideas were gradually becoming less and less substantial in men's minds, nay, perhaps, he felt that even to himself they had not all the clearness and power, with which they were realized by the glorious company of the Apostles," and "the noble army of martyrs." In his day that Batavian theology had already invaded England, which has since well nigh made our own pure English writers, as well as the men of the ancient Church, unintelligible to us. By Batavian theology, I mean that which, whether it appears in the form of Grotianism, or Witsianism, takes the ideas of commerce as the foundation of spiritual meditation, and the ideas of relationship, as only auxiliary and ornamental metaphors,—the theology which would expound such a passage as this, "the Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hands," by the notion of a bargain or a covenant, instead of using these passages as clearing up and satisfying the preparatory, and confessedly imperfect views respecting agreements and covenants, which the elder

dispensation, not however without a continual reference and homage to other and sublimer views, had disclosed. I do not at present enter into the question how their commercial conceptions of theology, and those hundred conceptions which are drawn from the practice of our law courts, have affected the life and soul of Christianity among us. I do not enquire whether the substitution of such thoughts for those which are connected with relationship, be any ways connected with that indifference to these relationships, which all admit prevails among us, and which sometimes does put on the pretence of religion itself. I shall not even enquire, except in the way of casual notice when I come to the next objection, whether this change has any thing to do with the divisions and strifes among us; whether carnal and earthly conceptions of Christianity may not be one source of carnal and earthly strifes among Christians: these are subjects of grave and awful consideration; but these must be reserved for another opportunity. The point I am now dealing with is that of simplicity; it is said that our Articles and the scholastic education which is connected with them, hinder our preachers from being simple. I fling back the charge in the face of the objector, and tell him, that it is the want of attention to these Articles, the want of using them as conditions of thought, and prosecuting a theological education with their assistance, the want of such a brave and diligent study as would deliver the mind from the bondage of coarse, grovelling, trade notions, which makes our popular preachers, whether in the Church or among Dissenters, so much the reverse of simple, so very unintelligible to the mass of the people. Oh! then for the sake of simplicity, of good old English

simplicity, of good old Christian simplicity, and not that which bears the name in our day,—the simplicity which is only another name for every thing artificial and unreal,—let us see to it that we purge our minds at the Universities of this commercial leaven, which unquestionably will mix up with all thoughts and feelings, if we leave our minds to the influence of the age and society around us. Nothing can save us but hardy conditions of thought, nothing but a reverence for those forms which were drawn up in times, when theology was not borrowed from commerce, or from jurisprudence, but when commerce and jurisprudence themselves derived their life and sustenance from theology.

This last remark brings me to the latter part of the objection. Other professions, it is said, at least have nothing to do with theological Articles. The argument on this part is a long one; and as I have already defended the Articles as necessary to studies which not in England only, but in every civilized country, are deemed necessary, on some grounds or other, for the education of a gentleman, I may be excused from doing more than just stating the positions which, did my limits permit, I would undertake to prove. If they awaken thought, one great part of my object will be answered. I would endeavour to shew, that, with respect to lawyers, the most important ideas of jurisprudence, not those which belong to archæological controversies, but those with which they are conversant every day in ordinary practice, are ideas which nothing but theology can unfold and interpret. Most of our lawyers, even those whose political tendencies are towards Benthamism, when they have become a little conversant with their profession, resent and ridicule the attempts of the Benthamites, to get

rid of all legal forms and fictions, because they cannot instantly discover for what use they were intended. These lawyers discover by practice, that the secret and inwoven operations of nature may be condemned on the same ground, and on precisely the same reason. But I think it will be admitted on all hands, that these practical lawyers may at times uphold the most important legislative principles, and the most really trivial legislative errors, through an incapacity of distinguishing the one from the other, and the sober fear, while conscious of that incapacity, lest they should sacrifice either. Now I would endeavour to shew, that, had they been thoroughly grounded and indoctrinated in principles which belong to a higher science than of mere positive law, great part of this incapacity would be removed, and they would acquire a habit of perceiving when forms and practices, for which there is no assignable motive of expediency, have a groundwork in the principles of society and humanity, and when they are merely the outgrowth of foolish and hasty legislation, or have been preserved after the reasons for them have passed away.

The modern professors of Medicine have saved me the trouble of demonstrating, that there is a connexion between their science and Theology. The labours of a part of these to cut off the link, are the best proofs of its existence. I should, however, had I time, enter into this argument also, for the purpose, amongst others, of shewing that freedom of enquiry, and even the toleration of dangerous opinions, are not hindered but promoted by the use of conditions of thought. A person whose son comes up raw and inexperienced from the country, to enter our modern schools of anatomy, might well be frightened at opening Mr.

Lawrence's Lectures, and finding how much of that faith, to which he had trusted for his preservation through the perils of youth, might be undermined by attendance on a course of physiological studies. But a parent whose son had been well disciplined with theological conditions of thought, need be under no such apprehension, need have no wish on any personal grounds that such lecturers should be silenced; not because the son would come up with resolute prejudice to stop his ears against every materialist insinuation, but because he would have so well comprehended beforehand the meaning of materialism, and whereabouts it enters into the sphere of human thought, and how it acts; because he would have discovered, long before he entered upon this course, that every superstition which has ever darkened the mind, has had its rise in materialism, either modifying spiritual truth, or coming forth in its own nakedness; and, lastly, because he would so well have understood the grounds of the question upon the study of which he was entering, that he would be in a condition to avail himself of all his teacher's practical information, without being affected by his theories, otherwise than with diversion at the pretence to originality which they put forth, or with sorrow at the unhappy abuse of words which stamps with the name of *free*, opinions which he knows from history have been the great enslavers of all feeling and energy.

And though no doubt the priest-taught student may be for a time contemned by his liberal associates, yet his sacerdotal knowledge, odious as it is, enabling him to look theories in the face, which their teachers have been used to divulge with a wink and a solemn shake of the head, and enabling him moreover to look

phenomena and facts in the face, which neither those teachers nor their pupils dare to confront, it must needs be regarded as something rather convenient, and not wholly despicable, however shocking and bigotted the ways in which he came by it.

Lastly, for the Statesman. Since under the head of History I have already spoken concerning him, my chief object would be to shew the application of theological conditions of thought to the questions, which are exercising him not as a general student, but at this particular crisis of our history,—questions, which he must discuss, if he shut himself up ever so much in mere practical details. Thus, for instance, I would endeavour to shew, that the man whose mind has been trained and exercised by theological conditions of thought, and has pursued the studies with which they are connected, can alone with a free and honest spirit enter upon the questions which rise out of Mr. Malthus' Essay on Population. He will, I conceive, find a set of facts, set forth in strong battle array, out of which Mr. Malthus adduces a conclusion which he calls a law. These facts his opponents, who see in his conclusion something hostile to the benevolence of nature, as they call it, do not like to examine. Now he, who is instructed and warned by these theological Articles, knows first of all that facts are facts, and that all the subtleties of human wit can never get rid of them. But he knows, secondly, from the same theological conditions of thought, that to deduce a law which governs a number of human beings, from the most satisfactory collection of facts respecting them, is not a safe method, for the simple reason that the majority of those persons are living anomalously. To admit that it is true of

the multitude, or mass of human creatures, that they will certainly gratify their instincts to a degree which is unfavourable to their happiness,—this he can easily and freely admit: but to say that this is then a law: this he will not admit; for the obedience to those instincts is, he has been instructed, in rebellion against the law of their being; he has been taught, that man acting according to law, is the lord over the instincts of his nature, and that man submitting to these instincts, and being led by them, has broken loose from his law,—is fallen into slavery. Now the difference, which may at first seem merely a formal distinction, is really connected with all the practical issue of the question. It shews us, in the first place, that no inference can be drawn against the benevolence of God, from the existence of any evil, which results not secondarily but primarily from resistance to His law. It shews, secondly, that no hopelessness about the state and prospects of man is justifiable on this ground,—unless there be no way for the restoration of man to the perfect state and law of his being. It shews, thirdly, that, from a nation be it ever so small, from a district be it ever so small, which is most submitting to the law which is meant for a man who is in the most virtuous state, we get the true idea of humanity, and not from a multitude of irregular cases, altogether unfit for experiment. And therefore he is warranted in concluding, on grounds of reason and experience both, that if there be any power to bring man into that state, as he believes there is, there will be nothing in any law of nature to resist, or counteract, or defeat his happiness, but that the earth will yet bring forth and bud, and the universe be brought to the state that was intended for it. Wherefore, with much thankfulness to Mr. Malthus for having made

known an important fact, and thereby shewn the inexpediency of many legislative measures, which before his time were accounted sage, the true statesman will yet utterly deny his pretensions to be the discoverer of a law, will gather no despondency from his speculations, and will feel that his own province of a legislator is still to look upon man as a moral being, and not to encourage him in warring against his physical condition.

But I pass on to the last objection which I shall notice. It may be expressed in some such words as these. 'After all your intellectual, and even your theological reasons for Subscription, you have not touched the great matter; there is one object more important to us as a nation and as a Church, than human knowledge, or even than theological knowledge. We are torn with divisions; we must have unity: any means that will reconcile men—any thing that will bring them together and make us once more a people at one among ourselves—is desirable, and we can scarcely purchase such a result too dearly; we must sacrifice feeling, utility, opinion, every thing to get unity.'

I have stated the case thus strongly, more strongly, perhaps, than almost any disputant would state it, because I desire to express entire and hearty concurrence in the sentiment. Even thus worded, I believe that opinion, feeling, utility, should be sacrificed for the sake of unity. I believe that sacrifices, enormous sacrifices, ought to be made in order to obtain it. I believe that the language of some excellent persons, who say, we must not give up truth for the sake of unity, though it contains a valuable meaning, is yet far less sound than it appears to be; for I see that truth is suffering every day and hour from the absence of unity.

I believe that wherever the spirit of unity is not, there neither can the spirit of truth be dwelling. If, then, it could be proved, that the removal of the Thirty-nine Articles from our Universities would tend to the reconciliation of parties, would be likely to remove stumbling blocks or divisions from the Church or from the nation, would heal one great breach in the Church of England, or would really bring the Dissenters into communion with her and with each other, I would say, without a moment's hesitation, all I have urged in their behalf is worth nothing; I care not how wise they are, how useful they may become; they stand in the way of a higher object—let them go. But it is because I believe that the removal of our Articles from the Universities would have no such effect; because I am convinced that it would not annihilate parties, nor in the least diminish their rancour against each other; that it would not be the means of establishing communion between Dissenters and Churchmen, or between the different classes of Dissenters; because I think I can shew that there are other real hindrances to unity which ought to be removed, other real sacrifices which ought to be made; and because I think that these Articles are exactly what prevent those great foes to unity and peace from prevailing more even than they do at present; because, lastly, I believe that these, rightly understood, would be the greatest helpers to unity, not only among ourselves, but also with those who have been separated from us; therefore do I cry out, Do not banish these Articles from our Universities; do not prohibit the youth of England from studying and using them far more effectually than they have done; do not abandon one of the best fortresses against the powers of

division and disunion and hatred which are abroad in the earth.

In using this language, it may be supposed that I intend to support the notion, so strenuously contended for by Bishop Burnet and others, that our Articles are Articles of peace. Now I will endeavour to explain in what sense I hold that opinion, and in what sense I entirely differ from it. That such an opinion should have prevailed so much in the Church, and that it should have numbered so many high authorities in its support, is *primâ facie* evidence that it has some foundation. But let any one read the Articles, and observe the studied, remarkable accuracy of the language, and the tone of decision which prevails throughout. Let him consider further the temper of mind which prevailed at that period, the energy, the intellectual vehemence which characterized all the men of that period, and our own Reformers amongst the rest, and ask himself whether he can believe, in deference to Bishop Burnet and all the authorities in the world, that they were written upon a scheme of conciliation and compromise. When did ever the words of any man belonging to the *juste milieu*, take such a form? He delights in generalities, he escapes into vagueness, he dares not denounce any thing, he dare not affirm any thing. He thinks A has a great deal to say for himself, and so has B; but *what* A has to say for himself, and *what* B has, he prudentially shrinks from declaring; and he is most pleased when, having deprived A's thoughts of all their life, and B's thoughts of all their life, he has succeeded in producing a dead residuum or deposit, to which all men lay equal claim, and to which the wise man willingly abdicates his claim altogether. It is not to

such divisions and apportionments of truth as these, that men such as our Reformers will submit. When the Solomons of the earth propose to divide the living child in twain, the pseudo-mother may indeed rejoice in so equitable an adjustment; but she who has toiled and travailed with it through many a night and day of anguish, has exulted in its birth and fed upon its smiles, will prove by her bitter cries, that to her any arrangement would be more tolerable than one which must put it to death.

But in what sense is it possible that Bishop Burnet, and others whom we would not willingly think wrong, may have been right? I answer, there are two methods of making peace, there are two methods of reconciliation. One is the method of him who keeps the *juste milieu:* he reconciles men by concentrating their weakness; all that is not decisive or positive in the opinion of either of the two parties he amalgamates into his own, leaving out only what is vital and energetic in each. He is half a Tory and half a Whig, that is to say, he has no politics at all; he is half an Arminian and half a Calvinist, that is to say, he has no theology at all.

But is it not possible to suppose a man who takes precisely the opposite course to this, and yet arrives at the same pacific and equitable result? Is it not possible to suppose a man, who believes that it is not the *negative* parts of each opinion which have most tendency to coalesce, but that the *positive* parts of these opinions are always struggling towards each other, and are kept apart only by the negative and contradictory elements with which they are mingled? Is it not possible for such a man to set out with a strong resolution and hope, that this good object, which he

has seen other kind hearted men labouring to effect, by a method against which all that is strong and energetic in man rebels, may be effected by another method, which satisfies what is strong and energetic, which affronts only what is disputatious and contradictory and hateful in man? Such a position, I believe, it is possible for man to take up; and he who has taken it up, and by God's grace means to maintain it, will, I think, begin to adopt Bishop Burnet's conclusion respecting our Articles, in a rather different sense from that which this worthy, but somewhat feeble and compromising prelate gave to it. Looking round on the state of practice in our day, he will say to himself, "There I see a set of men stoutly maintaining the Calvinistic hypothesis, and here is a set of men stoutly maintaining the one which is opposed to it. Between them I see a number of amiable persons, full of gentleness and goodnature, but wanting, as it appears to me, that stern and truth-loving spirit which I feel necessary to my own being, who will not adopt either view, but strive to shut their eyes to the whole question. Since I cannot sympathize with these, to which of those two opposing bodies shall I ally myself? Unwilling as I am to be half-hearted and indecisive, there is yet something in each which commends itself to my spirit, and something in each which continually disgusts me. I hear one descanting upon God's grace, and every thing that is fair on earth as the fruits of it,—and I am delighted. I hear the same party talk of sovereign grace in such a way as to leave the suspicion, that that Being, whom they have just described to me as the source of all good upon earth, is rather to be considered under the heathen notion of *a Power*,

exercising Mercy, than according to the scriptural view as *One who is Love, exercising Power*—and I am disgusted. I hear the other party singing joyful carols respecting the freedom of man,—and with heart and soul I join in them; but the next moment I hear them speaking as if that freedom were possible under conditions under which my reason and experience alike tell me that it never can be exercised, a condition of separation from the source of life and freedom,—and my heart sinks within me. I hear one speaking of the uselessness of all forms and constitutions and dispensations to a man, unless he punctually and for himself claim the benefit of them,—and I am delighted. I hear the same persons speaking as if there were no constitutions, no dispensation of which one can claim the benefit, as if faith created the benefits of which it availed itself,—and I despond. I hear the other speaking good tidings of an established harmony, a constituted order, intended for man as man, be there never so few who as yet understand what it means, and are admitted into it,—and I give thanks for such glorious truth. I hear the same persons contending that the act, by which I claim my birthright in an inheritance purchased long ago for my race by a dreadful agony, an act which, they admit, upon the largest view of its value, confers no certain portion of grace upon the unconscious subject, constitutes my title to this new and magnificent estate,—and I am lost in perplexity. But when I look further into these parties, I am struck with these phenomena. I find two classes of men in each, one delighting in the positive parts of their own creed, the other delighting in those which impugn the opinion of their adversaries. The distinction is clearly marked, though,

from the necessary mixture of human society and the weakness of men's hearts, they are confounded, and the former now and then assume the garb of the latter. With one of these classes in either party, I find I can hold happy communion; with the other class in both parties, none whatever. I may admire their adroitness in special pleading, their clever taunts, their well managed ridicule, in a word their skilful use of all the weapons which Christians have filched out of the world's armoury; but to think with them, or feel with them, is impossible;—their pleasure is, to think and to feel against other men, not with any.

"But then may it not be, that all those opinions which strike me as so painful, so contradictory to those which I was just before admiring and sympathizing in, may it not be that all these have originated, not with the good, holy, positive men of each party, but with its negationists, the men of strife in each party? Experience shews me more and more that this is the case. I see that it is only by accident that the good men of each party are brought to insist on those points, which in part are even more inconsistent with their own peculiar truths than with those of their adversaries; that, on the other hand, they are the only points with which these disputatious men meddle, the points which suit their taste, the only points that they can understand. Let me consider then, first, my own position, and next, how I can act on my brethren. I cannot join in their parties; the more I see of them as parties, the more I see that the loudest talkers in each must have the pre-eminence; the more I see of their parties, the more I see that they are at war with the very idea of a Church, the more I am convinced that they are tools, with which the enemies

of the Church are able to act for its destruction. Twenty-five years ago the Edinburgh Review was able to act on the high Church party, and by addressing itself to its love of order, and hatred of fanaticism, to make it indifferent to the great work of preaching the Gospel to the nations, and even to our own colonies; thus persuading those who have the highest views of the power of the Church, to neglect that great commission which is the great seal and evidence of its power. Now, persons holding the same views are acting, through some of their other organs, upon the Evangelical party, urging their popularity and the duty of enforcing their own views as reasons for their casting themselves into the arms of the people, and forsaking all other dependence, thus tempting those very men who speak most of the opposition of society to the opinions they preach, to hang slavishly on its support. Here are reasons enough against joining either of these parties; but then what refuge have I? None other but in the Church herself. None other but in standing upon that ground, against which I know the gates of confusion shall not prevail. None other but in binding myself to the symbols of the Church, and declaring that, by God's grace, no party symbols shall ever tempt me to abandon them. But then what chance is there of reconciling these opposing bodies? Some sacrifices, it is said, must be made on each side. Granted. Each side must consent to become assertors of what they believe, and for a while to abstain from the delight of denying what their adversaries believe. They need not, according to the common phrase, give up all that is peculiar to each, and talk only of what is common,—they cannot practise such a trick upon themselves. The Spirit of God

has guided them to the perception of particular truths, and these it is their province, their vocation, to maintain. They need not be afraid that this potent assertion of truth will not find them enemies enough; it is assertion and not denial that has always gotten men enemies; but they must be content to believe, that their adversaries may possibly have been led into the perception of truths, which they have yet but imperfectly apprehended, but which may nevertheless be necessary to the full establishment and support of their own. And when they have resolved on this course, and begun to act upon it, then methinks the promise will come into operation, "To him that hath shall be given;" to him who stands fast on the bit of truth which he has, and does not let it go for man or devil, and therefore respects every bit of truth which his brother may have apprehended, to him will be given a daily more enlarged foundation to rest upon; and gradually the deep gulph, which seemed to separate him from his opponents, when selfish pride and hostility have been cast into it, will close up. The dream of such things would be a dream indeed, if I hoped that all men would be thus reconciled. I know that this is impossible. It is only the honest, the really truth-seeking, whom any thing can reconcile; the distance between the others must grow wider each day; the question is not how to bring them to peace, but how to bring out those who would be at peace from among them. And I say, this is the way. Here are these Articles, which we are told are the ministers of dissension and the destroyers of unity, the harrowers of the Spirit; good men of both parties, meditate on these: throw your magazines and newspapers into the fire, and for a while betake yourselves to the study of

this ancient document, which men whom you both profess to revere have bequeathed to you: see whether you will not find in them the justification of every part of either of your opinions to which you really with your hearts cleave—of all those views, which you could not abandon, because they were part of your very life; and whether you will not find in them the detection and exposure of various superstitions which have hung as rags about you, and which, because they were those which most grieved your brethren, your partizans have persuaded you were the most precious and sacred."

But I admitted, that, if the removal of Articles would have united Dissenters to us and to each other, this would be an argument in favour of that measure, which all the arguments contained in this pamphlet could not overthrow. Again the question is, would this be the effect of such a step? There is, I believe, a practical want of knowledge of the real state of the Dissenters, which the study of their authorized organs increases rather than dispels. To know what these men are thinking and feeling in all the different sects, there is need of some more familiar and cordial acquaintance with them, than I am afraid some Churchmen are willing to cultivate. Such acquaintance would, I apprehend, discover to us in the heart of each body a set of men, of whose very existence the teachers and noisy men are willingly ignorant; these persons living in the enjoyment of dissenting privileges and immunities, enjoying all their glorious liberty of conscience, and freedom from human restraints and impositions, are really sighing and crying by reason of the hard and intolerable bondage, to which they inwardly feel themselves subjected; and what is the

bondage? why, the bondage to the sect itself; they feel that "the bed" of sectarianism "is shorter than that a man can stretch himself on it;" a "covering narrower than that he can wrap himself in it." They feel that they are hampered and penned in with a set of phrases, and words, and notions, which more effectually check all freedom, enfeeble knowledge, darken faith, and destroy communion, than the most direct tyranny; and yet even from this they are conscious that they are not exempt; the names of leaders and direct ministerial authority, scarcely exerted even in the Romish Church a more benumbing influence than over some of them. I do not say that these persons have yet sufficiently understood the wants of their own minds, to believe that those things which have been held up to them from their childhood as the badge of slavery, may really become the means of their emancipation. In some cases I know that it is far otherwise; the very restlessness and discontent of their own feelings drives them into politics, and makes some who are most inwardly conscious of their own oppression, the most sympathizing about ours. But for this effect I am afraid we have ourselves to blame. There have been many attempts made to conciliate the Dissenters; they have been met, with a sort of haughty distance, at public meetings, and clergymen have thought it an act of Christian charity to proclaim themselves members of a sect, in order to meet other sects half way. But though it has been the fashion of late years to treat Dissenters as *Dissenters* with something like friendliness, I do not think it has been at all the fashion to treat them heartily and affectionately as *men;* I do not think that Churchmen have felt as they ought, we have a position which we will not abandon; the

glory of that position is, that it is not an exclusive one, not a sectarian one; the glory of that position is, that it is one upon which all men may stand, who do not desire to be exclusive;—because, if this had been the feeling of our minds, and if our conduct had been conformed to it, I think that we should have understood that each party of these Dissenters has some separate principle for which he is contending; a true principle, an important principle, which he has made into an idol, by disconnecting it with others equally important. I think we should have said to ourselves, here is a person calling himself an Independent: he has got hold of this important positive truth, that each congregation ought to be distinct, but he has torn the doctrine away from the body of truth; he has fancied that he could not maintain the *distinctness* of congregations, without maintaining the *separateness* of congregations; and thus comes into collision with the Romanist, who has set up the unity of the Church against the distinctness of congregations: but I believe both; I believe that one is necessary to the other; I believe that there cannot be distinctness without unity, nor unity without distinctness. I would not therefore assail the man as an Independent, but I would claim fellowship with him as a Congregationalist. I will shew him that I go all lengths with him in his positive opinion; that I only differ from him in a point, which puts him at difference with others, who have also great truths to maintain, and puts him also, as I think I can shew him, at difference with himself.

In like manner we should have met the Anabaptist. We should have laid hold of the positive truth, that there must be a conscious and voluntary recognition

of our Church-membership, besides the act of sacramental fellowship; we should have shewn him that this is as much our tenet as his, that our service of Confirmation is a distinct acknowledgment of it, and that it is only the negative part of his creed,—the denial that there is another act of admission into Christ's body, an act setting forth that the constitution of the Church of Christ is an established constitution, not dependent on human faith, but fixed and certain in Christ, though no man should enter into it,—that it is only this part of his opinions with which we differ, and that this is the part which sets him at variance also with his dissenting brethren, and with the brethren of the Romish Church, and at variance also, we think we can shew him, with himself.

Precisely in the same manner we should address ourselves to a Quaker. We should shew him that we go all lengths with him, in the homage which we render to the Spirit of God,—in our belief of His presence and His operations; we should shew him that this was assumed in every service of our Church; we should tell him that we can admire and sympathize in the indignation of George Fox against the dry doctrinalism, and that, for the sake of it, and for his hearty affectionate spirit, we can forgive him those mad ravings against steeple houses and paid parsons, which they will hardly justify; we should shew him that we only differ from him, when he began to differ from himself and from the whole Church, denying to the Spirit of God the right and power to make use of human media and ordinances,—denying the fact that He has done so and does do so still; and thus denying His authority over institutions and nature, which we claim as His servants—the result of which denial is too

manifest; first, in their continual tendency to forget God as an *Object*, whilst they honour Him as a *Subject;* and, secondly, in their dangerous confusion of the Almighty Worker, with His own operations.

I dare to affirm that we may go on, and that we shall find among Unitarians also, that to which we may cordially address ourselves. Among these especially we see that it is negations and not positions which are the great foes of faith and of peace; and though in the mere statement of them it would be difficult to see much that is positive, yet in the minds and hearts of many who profess it, I am persuaded we may find a great deal. We may speak to that very honouring of the one God, and whilst we shew them, that the worship of the number One is the furthest thing possible from the worship of the one living and true God, we may yet profess a cordial agreement with them in this, that the pure idea of the unity of God, is the very sum and substance of Christianity, its foundation, and its top stone. We may admit, and that without the least qualification or embarrassment, that this truth has been oftentimes most cruelly and wickedly dealt with by some who are called orthodox; and then taking them to our Articles, we may shew them, that these very abuses, these very corruptions, are pointed out there; that we are warned against them, and taught to eschew them. We may shew them, that we only differ from them when they utterly desert their own professed principle of seeking after unity. We can shew them, that there is no such thing as sensible or material unity; that if matter be infinitely divisible, there cannot be. We can shew them, that as long as men turn to sensible appearances, and try things by that standard, they must be polytheists; and we

may shew them, that there is nevertheless a sublime and real idea of unity, to the knowledge of which, God, by His divine education of men, has been drawing them,—a unity with which they become acquainted by entering into and fulfilling the relations in which it is manifested; for that, first, he has brought man to look at Him through the relation of a family, and learn to know what unity means in that form; and, secondly, that he has taught them to look at Him in the nation, leading us into another and higher form of unity; and, lastly, has taught them to look at Him in the Church, gathering up all His former communications into this sublime sentence, "that they may be all one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they may be one in us."

The Articles then, I conceive, are no hindrance to Dissenters uniting with us, or with one another; but the more we become acquainted with their meaning and spirit, the more we shall be able to feel ourselves, and to shew them, what the grounds of unity and fellowship are, the more we shall be able to meet each person on the ground of the doctrine which has been revealed to him, and shew him that this doctrine forms an integral portion of our own faith. No doubt the spirit of our devotional formularies must animate our hearts as well as the wisdom of our intellectual formularies inform our understandings, if we would really bring men to a unity of faith and doctrine. This doubtless must be a gift from above, and be sought for by humble intercession. But that I am not telling dreams when I say, that not our forms, but something else which belongs to this age, is the hindrance to good men among the Dissenters from uniting with us, I will produce one proof and instance.

Not long ago a Wesleyan Methodist, whose language and style of writing proved him to be an honest and pious as well as a sensible man, undertook to answer the many invitations which Churchmen have made to his body to unite with us. Now what were the good man's difficulties? I have not his pamphlet at hand, and cannot quote his words, but of the substance I am sure, and the error, if I commit one, will presently be detected. 'We have,' he says, 'certain strong views about perfection and the sanctification of men's hearts by the Holy Spirit. *We find nothing hostile to these views in your Liturgy and Articles*, but while the Christian Observer and certain authorized publications of your Church continue to attack and abuse these doctrines, we must believe that you dissent from us, and therefore we cannot join you.' Now here is a testimony which is worth pages of writing; here is a man holding views, the proportionate importance of which to other views he probably greatly exaggerates,—which he has been accustomed to look at exclusively, till they have become magnified into idols in his mind; but still they are parts of the very life and substance of his heart, he has won them with his sword and his bow, or rather they have been gifts from an unseen Friend, and he will not part with them at our bidding. God forbid that he should! And who bids him part with them? The Church? Not at all. With all his prejudices he sees that she will let him enjoy his views, that she will sympathize with them, though in time she may enlarge and expand them, and destroy much of the superstition which now cleaves to them. But who bids him part with them? A nineteenth century magazine! one of the lights of the age! one of the promoters of unity! one of those dear

friends of the Church, who earnestly and steadily beseech her to alter her prayers, and deny the principles of her Catechism, that she may comprehend Dissenters!

There are some zealous and pious members of our Church, to whose meditation I would earnestly commend these remarks, and especially the fact which I have just set down,—I mean such men as Mr. Girdlestone of Sedgley, and Dr. Arnold of Rugby, whose zeal for uniting is no hypocritical pretence, but who have shewn themselves willing to sacrifice reputation among their brethren, and much that is very dear to all men, for the sake of promoting it. I do not think that all the extravagance of the scheme which one of them has recommended, would be a reason very much against considering or even embracing it, if it would accomplish the objects which the benevolent author expects; but if that whole scheme be founded on the ignorance of our actual position,—if it be the fact that the Church, as it now stands, is more really comprehensive than that alteration would make it,—if it be the fact that she has it in her power, by only making use of her formularies, by only presenting them fairly to her sons and to the Dissenters, to satisfy the wishes of those who really desire unity, and that without requiring from them the sacrifice of a single iota of their actual belief;—then I ask, will not these excellent men shew the real honesty and strength of their minds, by abandoning their own plans, however ingeniously conceived and fondly cherished, and by co-operating heart and hand in a work, really demanding far more sacrifices of taste and temper, of feeling and opinion, but requiring no sacrifice of our ancient symbols of faith and our theological Articles, wanting

not the assistance of Parliaments and Ministers, but wanting only the assistance of the Spirit of truth, unity, and concord, which has been promised to those who ask it?

And surely it is but a poor ambition in a world where evil is called good and good evil, and where bitter is put for sweet and sweet for bitter,—where the vile man is called liberal, and the churl said to be bountiful,—where love is cast out and despised, and lust, that has its dwelling hard by hate, usurps the name,—where the spirits of strife and dissension have attained such mighty power, that the Prince of Peace cannot enter but with a sword;—surely it is a poor ambition, in such a world, to be accounted friends of freedom, or truth, or unity; but *this* will be a delight worth seeking after, if we can look up to Him who searches the heart, and call Him to witness, that to be partakers ourselves, and to make our brethren partakers, of these precious gifts, is our heartiest and most inward desire,—for the fulfilment of which we would sacrifice all temporary concernments;—for the disappointment of which no blessings, which even He could vouchsafe, would compensate,—and which we are certain will not be disappointed, but will be perfectly accomplished, because He has wrought it in us, in despite of a rebellious nature, by his own free and reconciling Spirit.

NOTES.

Page 8. *Extracts from Antony à Wood's Annals.*

THE following extracts from the Annals of the University of Oxford shew, that the first introduction of the Articles into the University was *one* of a series of measures[a] which had for their object—not the exclusion of PAPISTS, as *members of a separate communion*, but—the rooting out of POPERY as an "*heretical pravity*" from the minds of students, and "the bringing up of youth in the knowledge and fear of God, in all manner of good learning and virtuous education, whereby after they may serve their Prince and Country in divers callings, for which respect a special care is to be had of those two Universities, that all meanes may be used to further the bringing up of youth that are bestowed there in all *good learning, civill education, and honest manners*, whereby the State and Commonwealth may receive hereafter great good[b]."

"1578. About the same time, that a special care should be had for the quelling and abolishing *heretical pravity* (*now accounted Popery, but before Wicclivism*) which, as 'twas pretended, did yet remain in the University, several Doctors and others were on the 20th December following authorized in Convocation to correct and amplify the Statute against it.

[a] That these measures would operate *indirectly* to the exclusion of confirmed heretics (whether Papists or others) is not denied, and would follow as a matter of course; all that is contended is that the *primary* and *direct* object in view was *education*, not *exclusion*.

[b] Letter of the Chancellor and Queen's Council (1593) about the discouragement of Interludes and Playes.

Soon after, the business being performed, not without some trouble, they presented their labors to the Convocation in the latter end of January following, which, being publicly read and perused, were at length accepted, with an explanation of some additions thereunto *for the benefit of the youth, and the informing them in true religion.* The particulars being in Latin you shall have them as they stand in the Register.

"I. *Ad extirpandam hæresim quamcunque et ad informandum in verâ pietate juventutem,* libros hosce legendos censemus et statuimus, viz. *Catechismum Alex. Nvelli* majorem Lat. vel Græce, &c. vel *Catechismum Jo. Calvini* Lat. Gr. vel Hebr. vel *Elementa Christianæ Religionis* And. Hyperii, vel *Catechismum Heidelbergensem* pro captu auditorum et arbitrio legendum.

"II. His *possunt adjungi Hen. Bullingeri Catechesis* pro adultis, *et Institt. Calvini, vel Apologia Eccl. Anglicanæ, vel Articuli Religionis* in Synodo Lond. conscripti et authoritate Regia editi, cum explicatione locorum communium, testimoniis e Sacrâ Scripturâ aut interdum è Patribus desumptis. Ad primam lectionem juniores ad secundam provectiores omnes nullo gradû insignitos astringi volumus.

"III. Catechismos omnes, *sanæ huic doctrinæ* contrarios, aliosque *libros superstitiosos et papisticos* legi et haberi interdicimus."

* * * * *

"These heads or articles *for the expelling of Popery* being confirmed by the University, were imitated in another way by the citizens, viz. that whereas they had Sermons but seldom delivered to them in their public Church of St. Martin, they allowed twenty marks yearly to two Lecturers to preach by turns every Sunday in the said Church, selecting then two zealous Calvinists."

"1580. It must now be observed, that as the University the year before took care about *Catechising and Instructing* the juniors in such principles of Protestancy, that they themselves had been trained up in, which were much disliked by some that durst not as yet contradict them; so did they about preaching, setting constant Sermons, (which hitherto were but rarely used,) and forcing the youths not only to be present at, but give an account to their Tutors of them. . . . ."

" . . . . . And all this was done that the Word of God and Protestantism might encrease, and Romanism decay.

" 1581. The Members of the University, though *they had before made orders* for the *advancement of Religion and Learning*, yet I find them not all duly observed; also that whereas they had made other Injunctions for the reformation of several abuses, not well observed, complaints again were sent up to our Chancellor, (Leycester.) Whereupon, *after consultation had with several of the Academians*, he sends his letters to the University. . . . . wherein he tells them, that for the reformation of such matters he had sent enclosed certain proposals.

" Imprimis That whereas the old order of Matriculation is, that within 6 dayes of every Scholars first comming to Oxford, he shall take an oath to observe the Statutes of this University, &c. and forasmuch as by the negligence and carelessness of many Heads this hath been and daily is omitted. . . . . and by this means many Papists have heretofore and may hereafter lurke among you, and *be brought up by corrupt Tutors, nether yelding to God nor to her Majestie or your Universitye* theare bounden duty, as hath of late years too much appeared, and is evident in sundry yonge Students in your Universitie, sum being atte Roome, sum in the Seminaries and other places, *all out of her Majesties obedience*, I have thought to have this order following to be established.

" First, that no Scholler be admitted, unless he first before the Vice-Chancellor subscribe to the Articles of Religion agreed upon, take the oathe of the Majesties Supremacy, sweare to observe the Statutes of the University, if he be of lawful years to take an othe, &c.

" Secondly, that forasmuch as sundry parents, being themselves recusants or known or suspected Papists, have sent their sunns to the University, and dayly do and are *desirous to have their sunns by all likelyhood trayned up in the same Religion*, and for that purpose have, it may appeare, certain Tutors among you, of whome at the least they hope well to have their sons *instructed after theire* owne desire, I have thought good also to wish that by order of Convocation it may be likewise established, that no Tutor be allowed hereafter, but such as be of *sound religion*, and that under the hand of the Vice-Chancellor, and three Doctors of Divinity, and

three Bachelors of Divinity, or three Preachers for that purpose assembled together.

"Thirdly, Forasmuch as there is an order of catechising established among you, whereby *great increase of virtue and knowledge may be gathered*, I have thought good to wish to see the continuance of so godly an exercise.

"Fourthly, Whereas the profession of the Tongues and Sciences is not onlie most necessary for the advancement of good learning in your University, and trayning up of young Students in the same, but also that there are large stipends allowed for the Professors thereof: yet I understand that some of them have not been for the space of some whole years together read.....

"Fifthly, Understanding the number of Students with you in Divinity to be greatly increased, for the which I thanke God, I could wish your exercises in that Facultie, especially in Disputations in the open Schools to be somewhâte more——— The paines is not great, the Exercise most laudable, and such as shall redound greatly both *to the glory of God, benefit both to the whole Universitye, and particular doers thereof, &c. &c.*"

"All which being read in the Convocation, the Vice-Chancellor added three more Proposals, &c. and .... they framed these Decrees following from them.

* * * * *

"These being the Decrees published this year, no man can think but that they were duly observed, *that Religion was thereby in hopes to be reformed*, and that *Learning* and *Virtue* was in possibility of flourishing."

"1589. I must now further tell you that what was omitted for the reformation of the University in the time of ROBERT Earl of LEICESTER, our Chancellor, was now eagerly prosecuted by his successor Sir CHRISTOPHER HATTON, Lord Chancellor of England; for upon consultation had with several Heads and Doctors of the University, as also upon the perusal of our Statutes and old Registers, he sends his letters, dated 19 August, with these injunctions following, to be published in Convocation, to the end, as he saith, the ancient dignity of the University be recovered, *learning* continued, *such as are hereafter to be employed both in Church and Commonwealth be better*

educated, and the estimation and credit of the members of the University be repaired, &c.

" First, therefore, as your Chancellor, I do require at your hands that your Statutes or Decrees for Matriculation, and Subscription by those that are matriculated to the Articles of Religion agreed upon Anno 1562, and to her Majesty's Supremacie, be carefully observed and henceforth put in execution, with all the other branches thereof. . . . . "

Then follow several Articles requiring the observance of all Statutes or Decrees relating to Prayers, Sermons, &c. of " the Decree *ad extirpandam hæresim*, made 1589 [lege 1578 ?] for catechising," and of all Statutes relating to public Lectures, Disputations, and Discipline.

" 1594. So much concerning Decrees to avoid trouble; now let's go to others for the settling of good order and reformation. As Sir CHRISTOPHER HATTON therefore, our Chancellor, had before endeavoured to reform what was neglected in the time of the Earl of LEICESTER, so doth now the Lord BUCKHURST, that in the time of Hatton, his immediate predecessor; for being informed by some of the Heads and Sages of the University, of the great disorder among us, sent his Letters dated the 10th of October to be communicated by the Vice-Chancellor to the Convocation, which being received they were publicly read four days after, the effect of which follows:

" ' Whereas the good estate and quiet government of the Realme both in Church and Commonwealth, dependeth not a little upon the good proceedings and carefull government of the Universities, as being the verie well-springs from which *religion, learning, virtue, and good discipline*, should flow over all the Realme,' &c."

After this follow four recommendations:

The first, that the University may be " purged from all *Jesuits, Seminaries*, and *notorious Recusants*," and " also that no justly suspected person, or known *Papist* at the least, may be suffered in any wise to have *the tuition and teaching of young Schollers to . . . . the danger and corruption of such Pupilles committed unto them*."

The second, about Lectures, Disputations, and Exercises.

The third, about the revival of the ancient discipline in

private Colleges, and a reverent distinction of Degrees in public.

The fourth, about the reformation of academical apparell.

"Which orders being read in Convocation, and the execution of them put on the Heads of Colleges, *discipline became much refined, and virtue increased.* However, as by many such orders the Roman Catholicks had *a strict eye always over them*, yet the Puritans, who were now numerous in the University, being not so much regarded, did in effect do more harm than they."

Page 53. *On the Arian Heresy, as an exemplification of Horne Tooke's Theory*[c].

A most striking anticipation and application of Horne Tooke's theory is found in the well-known argument of Arius, that he merely affirms Christ to be the Son of God in the same sense in which all Christians and all holy men are called in Scripture the sons of God. Now, that the sense in which Christians are called 'sons of God,' is homogeneous with that in which Christ is the Son of God, is a truth which Athanasius believed, and for which he would have died as readily as Arius. 'He is not ashamed to call them brethren;' 'That they all may be one, as Thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, &c.;' these are passages which Athanasius cherished far more tenderly than his opponent ever did. This truth of Arius is only *half* the truth which the Apostle is maintaining in the Epistle to the Hebrews, essential, as he shews, to the other half which Arius rejected. Where then lay the difference? Arius interpreted the words 'Son of God,' as applied to Christ (*i. e.* in their highest sense) by the words as applied to Christians (in a lower sense). St. Paul taught, and Athanasius believed, that the words 'Son of God' have no meaning unless there be an Only-begotten Son, one with the Father, in whom Christians are adopted, and by whom they have power to *become*, by actual apprehension, what they are by constitution. In fact, ecclesiastical history is full of

[c] If this note had reached the printer before page 53 was printed off, it would have superseded the note which stands at the foot of that page.

[d] See the letter of Eusebius of Nicomedia, to Paulinus of Tyre, and the circular letter of Alexander of Alexandria. *Newman on the Arians*, c. ii. sect. v.

commentaries upon the principle which Horne Tooke brought forth as perfectly novel and original at the end of the eighteenth century.

Page 68. *On Rhetoric.*

I have not mentioned RHETORIC among the Humanity studies of Oxford. I do not pretend, however, to exclude it from the rank of a science. Aristotle has asserted its claims to that dignity; and who, on such a point, could gainsay such an authority? But though he has maintained, and, I think, proved that it has, ideally, a distinct foundation and a peculiar function, yet, practically, he treats it as dependent for its very existence upon Logic and Ethics, and as requiring for its elucidation and actual working a knowledge of Poetry, History, and Politics. And it must be evident to every person who studies his masterly treatise, that it is only by this means, viz. by divesting Rhetoric of its independency, that he has evaded the powerful objections of Plato in the Gorgias. Possibly, therefore, he would have agreed with Bacon, (who, it must be confessed, extends the same observation to Logic,) that Rhetoric is an art fitter for Graduates than Novices. But at all events, as to the immediate object of this pamphlet, it is evident that Rhetoric, according to the idea of the only author who has treated it scientifically, and whose work is the Oxford text book, being based upon sciences, which have their ground in Theology, and which cannot be explained but by means of it, must itself have the same foundation, and need the same helps for its interpretation.

THE END.

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